Dynamic Scenes and Camera Networks by Marci Lenore Meingast et al.
Dynamic Scenes and Camera Networks
Marci Lenore Meingast
Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
University of California at Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2009-33
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-33.html
February 22, 2009Copyright  2009, by the author(s).
All rights reserved.
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission.Dynamic Scenes and Camera Networks
by
Marci Lenore Meingast
B.S. (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) 2001
M.S. (University of California, Berkeley) 2005
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Engineering-Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
in the
GRADUATE DIVISION
of the
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
Committee in charge:
Professor Shankar Sastry, Chair
Professor Ruzena Bajcsy
Professor Pamela Samuelson
Fall 2008The dissertation of Marci Lenore Meingast is approved:
Chair Date
Date
Date
University of California, Berkeley
Fall 2008Dynamic Scenes and Camera Networks
Copyright 2008
by
Marci Lenore Meingast1
Abstract
Dynamic Scenes and Camera Networks
by
Marci Lenore Meingast
Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering-Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Shankar Sastry, Chair
In recent years, camera networks have changed dramatically. These networks now
incorporate more cameras than ever before and have the capability to capture and
record dynamic scene. Additionally, these networks are being used in more public
and uncontrolled environments. The images from the cameras provide a rich source
of information about the environment and have led to an increase in camera network
applications. However, there still exist a number of implementational and social issues
regarding camera networks. In this dissertation, we address aspects of the issues of
data correlation, data integrity, and data privacy in these networks.
In looking at data correlation, we focus on the localization of the cameras in
the network. We present a method for doing automatic localization by using the
dynamic scene information these networks are now able to capture and store. Since2
the cameras in the network may be wide-baseline and not see similar static features,
we use the dynamic scene data and detect moving objects in the scene. In an intra-
camera process, we correlate the moving objects and build their trajectories within
each image plane. These trajectories become the spatio-temporal features we then
use in an inter-camera step by correlating them between the cameras in order to
determine localization.
Regarding data integrity, we present a method using dynamic data for detection
attacks on the cameras in the network. By doing intra-camera correlations as well as
inter-camera correlations of spatio-temporal features, we develop a reputation system
that is robust to the dynamic environment being observed, yet can detect when
attacks occur. Our method determines when a camera has been attacked and is
presenting faulty data.
Finally, in addressing data privacy, we look at the social concerns surrounding
camera networks in public places and how video data a®ects privacy. We present a
study on what privacy expectations individuals have in a public place and di®erent
factors that in°uence these expectations. Additionally, we look at di®erent technical
measures and examine whether they can uphold these privacy expectations.
Above all our hope is that this dissertation will aid in making current camera
networks and dynamic scene information more bene¯cial. Additionally, we hope to
inspire others to explore how computer vision can aid in real applications and go
beyond the single frame, incorporating multi-view and dynamic information.3
Professor Shankar Sastry
Dissertation Committee Chairi
To Mindy ¯rst because she asked,
To Melissa for the power of three,
And to those two brave souls who raised us all,
And love us unconditionally.ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I hate cameras. They are so much more sure than I am about everything.
John Steinbeck (1902-1968)
1.1 Evolution of Camera Networks
Cameras have been around in some form or another since approximately 1826 [91],
but it is only within the last century that the capability to capture the dynamics of
a scene through faster exposure time has come about. Along with this has come the
use of camera networks to monitor dynamic scenes. Camera networks consist of some
number of cameras which have sensing, communication and processing capabilities.
These cameras are used to monitor a designated environment and transmit the visual
information to receivers in the network - which can be anything from a central base
station with monitors to other cameras in the network - in order to perform some2
speci¯ed task(s).
In their earliest forms, camera networks were used to transmit images from a
remote location to a monitoring station where these images would be displayed. One
of the ¯rst examples of a camera network was the closed-circuit television (CCTV)
system installed by Siemens AG in 1942 in Peenemnde, Germany [22]. Used to observe
the V-2 rockets, this CCTV system consisted of a few remote black and white cameras
which just transmitted the visual information back to a monitors in the bunker so
people could watch the rocket launch.
Technology continued to advance, changing the capabilities of camera networks.
In the 1960's, switch boxes were added to camera networks which allowed operators to
change between cameras. This enabled operators to switch between multiple camera
views on one monitor, but only one camera could be viewed at a time. However,
these systems were still relatively simple with black and white images, very poor
resolution and coaxial cable in use as part of the system. Individual cameras had to
be individually connected to a monitors, which were also black and white.
In the 1970's, multiplexers, video casette recorders(VCRs) and solid state cameras
changed the face of camera networks once again. With the use of multiplexers, now
the viewing screen could be partitioned to show multiple views on the same monitor.
The use of VCRs allowed recording of the images from the cameras and video dis-
tribution. This was a major shift from previous camera networks which were mostly
used to transmit images, but not record or store them for any signi¯cant period of3
time. While the ¯rst video tape recorder (VTR) was invented in 1951, it was quite ex-
pensive, costing $50,000, and di±cult to use [29]. The VCR was much less expensive,
costing a couple thousand at most, and used removable videotape cassettes containing
magnetic tape for recording [3]. Solid state cameras helped improve reliability and
the integration of VCRs.
Even with these advances, camera networks were hard to use, expensive, and not
very prevalent. VCRs were not reliable for recording and the quality of the recordings
was very poor. The combination of low resolution camera images, poor quality video
tapes and low tech solutions meant that grainy and unclear images could not be
relied on even for conclusive identi¯cation purposes. There was no way to do motion
detection from the VCR ¯lm footage. Additionally, these camera networks were
expensive for what you got, in regards to both equipment cost and the installation,
and typically only used in limited areas.
Camera networks have continued to change as both the camera technology and the
platforms have advanced. With the cameras, there was a switch color images being
transmitted instead of black and white, increased frame rates, higher resolution and
the change to digital. Additionally, platforms have changed. Digital video recorder
and computers have taken over as recording and storage devices making it easier to
transmit and store images. Images can be time and date stamped making it easier
to review video. In conjunction with this, prices have dropped for these components
making camera networks more feasible to implement. Additionally, the switch to4
digital and the ease of storage has made image analysis more feasible.
These changes have lead to two major shifts in current camera networks from their
predecessors due to the changes in capabilities and lower cost. First, high quality video
rate images are now easier to capture, transmit and store reliably. The monitoring
of dynamic scenes can be done at a much higher resolution in real-time and reliably
stored in case one wants to go back and review footage. The move to digital also
increases the ease with which image analysis can be done. High resolution dynamic
scenes can be not only monitored, but with more reliable video rate images, it is now
possible to do not only single frame analysis, but multi-frame analysis, which takes
into account both the spatial and temporal dynamics of the scene. Today's camera
networks have more advanced allow for the detection and following of motion.
The second shift is the expanding size and the changing usage of camera networks.
The cost of these systems has come down remarkably, allowing the use of many more
camera and for many more applications where it once might have been monetarily and
technically infeasible. The number of cameras in the network is no longer simply one
or two, limited by coaxial cables linked to monitors. Now camera network vary from a
few cameras to up to hundreds and hundred linked together and using wireless or wired
technology. Camera networks are seeing an increase in use and their applications in
more uncontrolled environment and particularly, public spaces, is more common. In
the past two decades, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001, the use of
camera networks in public spaces for surveillance has taken o®, especially in countries5
such as the United Kingdom, where the total number of cameras is estimated at
around 4,200,000 [51]. In the U.S., Chicago, New York, New Orleans and other cities
have deployments of camera networks to monitor areas of interest for undesirable
activities[9, 62, 4, 58].
In addition to surveillance, camera networks are seeing use in industrial processes
to supervise the processes that take place under dangerous conditions for humans,
particularly in the chemical industry. Many cities and have camera networks mon-
itoring tra±c to detect congestion and notice accidents. Many of these cameras
however, are owned by private companies and transmit data to drivers' GPS systems.
For example, the London congestion charge is enforced by cameras positioned at the
boundaries of and inside the congestion charge zone, which automatically read the
registration plates of cars [5] . If the driver does not pay the charge then a ¯ne will
be imposed.
These two shifts with current camera networks lead to many challenges, both from
an implementation viewpoint and a social viewpoint. From the implementation view-
point, there are challenges in how to setup these camera networks so that the video
rate data can be used e®ectively. While it has become easier to capture, transmit,
and store this data with high quality, there are many open questions on how the
analysis of dynamic scenes can be done in a more automatic fashion to help achieve
the goals of the camera network. From the social viewpoint, there are issues on what
this change in data collection means in the new settings that camera networks are6
being used for. Particularly, how should camera networks that collect high quality
video information interact within public settings and how is private data protected.
In this thesis, we address some of these current challenges by looking at the aspects
of data correlation, data integrity, and data privacy with the modern state of camera
networks.
1.2 Challenges of Current Camera Networks
In looking at the challenges that face current camera networks, data correlation,
data integrity, and data privacy are some of the aspects that need consideration. We
explain what these terms mean in relation to camera networks and their importance
in how modern camera networks operate.
Data correlation: For a network of cameras, correlating the data means knowing
how image data from each camera relates to image data from the other cameras in
the network. More speci¯cally, it is how each camera's ¯eld of view and the scene
it's seeing is related to the ¯elds of view of the other cameras in the network and
what they see at any given time. For example, Figure 1.1 shows that camera C7 and
camera C5 have an overlap in their ¯eld of view.
Understanding this relation provides the groundwork for additional steps that can
help achieve goals of the network. Knowing how the image data between cameras is
correlated is a useful building block for many tools in current camera networks where
image data from multiple cameras must be used in conjunction with one another. For7
Figure 1.1: An example camera network with each camera labeled as Ci where i 2
1;2;:::;17
example, if portions of two cameras have identical views, then both do not need to
transmit this information, only one needs to be used and redundant data transmission
can be eliminated. This can free up bandwidth while still allowing needed information
to be delivered. With the growing size of camera networks, bandwidth is an important
commodity that must be used e±ciently.
If a tracking application is going to be used in a camera network, knowing how
each camera's ¯eld of view relates to the others in the network is helpful. Once this
is known, when one camera is tracking an object a distribution on which cameras
should next start tracking that object can be determined instead of looking over all8
the cameras in the network to detect the object again.
Data integrity: This is the assurance that the data, the images from the cameras,
are unchanged from creation to reception. In order to have integrity, the images the
cameras are taking must be of the location(s) they are required to be observing and
this image data must be getting sent to designated entities without being altered.
Since camera network data is depended upon for di®ering activities, such as law
enforcement and tra±c monitoring, the reliability and correctness of that data is
critical.
An example of this data integrity getting compromised is demonstrated in Figures
1.1 and 1.2. The setup in Figure 1.1 is what is expected from the network. Cameras
C5 and C7 are suppose to be monitoring these designated areas and are expected to
have an overlap in their ¯elds of view. If the camera network has been compromised by
an adversary moving one of the cameras, as shown in Figure 1.2, then the integrity of
the data is compromised as the cameras are no longer observing their expected areas.
As shown in this ¯gure, camera C5 has been moved such that its ¯eld of view is now
covering a completely di®erent area than what is expected. Additionally, there is no
overlap between the ¯elds of view of camera C5 and camera C7.
As applications of current camera network are increasing, they are being used in
public spaces and other uncontrolled areas where the network can be tampered with.
Verifying and maintaining data integrity in these situations presents new challenges
as the network can be tampered with at any stage in the data °ow path by an outside9
adversary.
Data privacy: Data privacy is the relationship between collection and dissem-
ination of data, technology, the public expectation of privacy, and the legal issues
surrounding them. In relation to camera networks and images, a subset of the topic
of data privacy, termed visual privacy, is what must be looked at. Visual privacy
can then be de¯ned as the relationship between collection and dissemination of visual
information, the public expectation of privacy, and the legal issues surrounding this
information.
Current camera networks have created increasing interest in understanding the
Figure 1.2: A example of a camera network where the integrity has been compromised
due camera C5's change in ¯eld of view10
advantages and disadvantages of such deployments and how they a®ect visual privacy.
As current camera networks are on a much larger scale than their predecessors, are
being used in more public space, and now can more easily collect dynamic visual data,
this has increased the interest in visual privacy in regard to this technology. Current
camera networks are in public spaces where they can easily capture, transmit, and
store any of the actions of the public operating in that space. This visual information
can be used for purposes such as surveillance and video analytics.
Maintaining data privacy when using camera networks is important in order to
preserve the values society deems important while still gaining bene¯t from the net-
work. For example, in the U.S. if a camera network is setup to do surveillance in
a public space for crime monitoring, but instead the data is used to quell political
speech, this does not uphold the ¯rst amendment of the U.S. constitution. The right
set forth by the ¯rst amendment has been deemed as a valuable freedom in society,
thus the camera network and its use would be encroaching on this. As camera net-
works move more and more into the public space, upholding visual privacy becomes
increasingly important as more personal data of the public is getting collected.
1.3 Our Contributions to Tackling the Challenges
Given the aspects of data correlation, data integrity, and data privacy, we have
structured a set of projects that tackles discrete issues within each of these de¯nitions
with regard to current camera networks. With these projects, the goal is to help make11
camera networks operate more e®ectively in their current roles.
In terms of data correlation, we develop a method for localizing cameras in a
network that can be applied to a variety camera networks. In particular, it can
be applied to wide-baseline networks that are becoming more common and networks
where static features are not adequate. Current camera networks use many cameras in
varying setups and these cameras cover a much larger physical space than in the past.
Thus, determining this correlation for current camera networks is not straightforward
as there may be no common visually similarity between them to base correlation on or
ambiguous visual similarity in features resulting in multiple correlation possibilities.
By taking advantage of the dynamic scenes these current networks can capture, we use
the motion of objects from these scenes as a means for determining the localization
of the cameras in the network and how each camera's ¯eld of view relates to one
another. An overview and background on localization is given in Chapter 2. In
Chapter 3, we discuss our method using motion from objects in the dynamic scene
and present results of this method on di®erent camera network setups. In Chapter
4, we extend this method by combining the motion data, through data fusion, with
radio information. We conclude with a discussion of the localization in Chapter 5.
In addressing the data integrity element, we look at how to detect intrusion attacks
on the cameras themselves, where the image data is being obtained. As current
camera networks are being used in more uncontrolled, public, environments where
they can be tampered with, it is important to determine when image data from the12
cameras is reliable or not. Methods for protecting data while in transmission and
determining if it has been tampered with, such as encryption and watermarking,
already exist. Additionally, on the storage end, there are methods, for example
access keys, that can be used for protecting the data. However, little has been done
in looking at how to determine if the cameras themselves have been tampered with
and determining if they are sending faulty data.
We present a reputation system based on spatio-temporal image correlation data
from the dynamic scenes to determine if a camera has been tampered with. By using
varying types of features to build a reputation, we show what kinds of attacks can
be detected in varying types of camera setups. A background on reputation and
attack detection in is given in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we present our reputation
system for detecting attacks on cameras in the network and the varying visual and
motion features that are used. Additionally, results of this method on di®erent camera
network setups is given.
To deal with the visual privacy element, we look at the expectations of privacy
in terms of visual data in surveillance in public spaces. Visual privacy is an open
and rather unde¯ned area and there are varying policies, yet very little has been
done in the way of looking at public expectations in the spaces where surveillance
is happening. Through the subject study, we give an insight into what these expec-
tations are. To try and tease out public expectations on camera networks in public
spaces, we present a case study of subjects being surveilled and their reactions to the13
surveillance. I present technical solutions based on image analysis as privacy measures
and see whether these methods uphold their expectations. An overview on di®erent
camera network policies laws related to image data is given in Chapter 8. The case
study on public expectations of privacy and proposed technical solutions for camera
networks is presented in Chapter 9. We conclude with a discussion of results from
both and future directions for maintaining privacy in camera networks in Chapter 10.14
Chapter 2
Introduction and Background on
Camera Network Localization
We're not lost. We're locationally challenged.
John M. Ford (1957-2006)
Localization plays an important part in any network setup as it is a building block
for many applications from data fusion to security protocols. Localization in regards
to networks of sensors means determining where the sensors are in relation to one
another and how their sensing ¯elds are related. In terms of camera networks, this
means knowing the positions of the cameras relative to one another as well as the
orientation of each camera's ¯eld of view. An example of this is shown in Figure
2.1. The ¯elds of view of cameras C5 and C7 overlap and are related by the extrinsic
parameters for orientation, R57, and position, ¸57T57.
In camera networks, knowing how the ¯elds of view of each camera relate to15
Figure 2.1: Localization Example
the others in the network is the building block for many tools in current camera
networks where image data from multiple cameras must be used in conjunction with
one another. In this chapter, we provide a brief an overview of localization, how it
has been done in traditional low-bandwidth sensor networks, and how it is developing
for high-bandwidth camera networks. We discuss the importance of using the motion
information current camera networks captures from the dynamic scenes and how our
approach takes advantage of this for localization.16
2.1 Sensor Network Localization and the Impor-
tance of Image Data
Camera networks can be thought of as high-bandwidth networks of sensors as they
are made up of spatially distributed autonomous devices with sensing capabilities
that cooperatively monitor an environment. The term sensor network traditionally
refers to low-bandwidth sensors such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, and
radio sensors. For the purposes of this section, we will di®erentiate between these
types of sensor networks and camera networks by respectively referring to them as
low-bandwidth and high-bandwidth networks.
Localizing networks of sensors is not a new ¯eld and is well examined in the
low-bandwidth sensor network community. In this community, localization is an im-
portant aspect for e®ective use of the network. There are di®ering automatic methods
that have developed for localization of low-bandwidth networks. Many current au-
tomatic low-bandwidth sensor networks are localized using acoustic information and
radio frequency intensities. These are active methods in which acoustic or radio sig-
nals are sent out and the received signal strength indicators, time of arrival, time
di®erence of arrival, or angle of arrival are used to determine the localization of the
sensors [42]. Using these features, the position of the sensors in 2D and sometimes
3D space can be determined.
As low-bandwidth sensors are often not directional, knowing the position alone17
allows higher level methods that need localization, such as data fusion, multi-hop rout-
ing, and security measure such as key-generation, to run on these networks. However,
in translating these low-bandwidth methods over to camera networks, these methods
do not provide all the localization parameters necessary for camera networks to per-
form higher level tasks, such as image data fusion or camera hando®, as there is
no information on ¯eld of view orientation of the cameras. As cameras are direc-
tional sensors, the position alone will not give the all the relevant data in order to
determine how to interpret the image data in these higher level tasks. Thus, even if
radio sensor were attached to cameras in a network, the localization methods used in
low-bandwidth sensor networks would not provide enough information to localize the
cameras.
In order to perform tasks with visual information, such as tracking across multiple
cameras, it must be known not only where the cameras are positioned in the 3D space,
but also how the cameras' ¯elds of view are oriented and how they overlap with other
cameras' ¯elds of view. Since this information is speci¯c to the visual input gathered
by the cameras, it is logical to develop a localization method based on using the
images from the cameras. In our work, we look at how to use visual information,
speci¯cally from dynamic scenes, in order to localize the cameras in the network.18
2.2 Related Work on the Use of Image Data in
Localizing
In using visual information for localization, computer vision researchers have made
tremendous progress in doing automatic image alignment and determining the ori-
entation, R, and position, T, up to scale, in multi-view settings. Using visual in-
formation, geometric constraints have been well established that allow for one image
to be warped into another. Thus, it can be determined how one image is related to
another. Solutions to satisfy these constraints rely on detecting common appearance-
based features between both images. This is normally done in three steps: detecting
the features, encoding them using feature descriptors, and ¯nally matching them
against each other. Many a±ne covariant region detectors are available, namely, the
MSER detector [14], the Salient region detector [86], the Harris-A±ne detector, the
Hessian-A±ne detector [55], the Intensity extrema based detector (IBR), and the
Edge based detector (EBR) [90]. There are also quite a number of feature descriptors
such as the Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [45], Gradient Location and
Orientation Histogram (GLOH), Shape Context [10], Moments [30], Steerable ¯lters
[25] and cross correlation of pixels. Important attributes are invariance to scale, rota-
tion, transformation or changes in illumination. A good overview over both detectors
and descriptors can be found in [57, 56]. Using these types of methods work well
when the ¯elds of view of the cameras in a network are related to each other by a19
small baseline. Given this, automatic appearance-based features can be detected. For
example, in [47], the authors localize a network of cameras by assuming there is a
common set of visual features seen by each set of three cameras that can be used for
external calibration.
These previous methods rely on cameras sharing similar static feature with similar
appearance. However, this is often not the case in many camera networks, as they
can be wide baseline and even if they see the same objects in the scene the image
features of that object look di®erent in each camera and do not lend well to visual
appearance correspondence. For instance, in Figure 2.2, these wide-baseline cameras
are viewing the same scene, yet if an automatic feature detection method is used,
there is an incorrect matching of features as the images do not contain the same
static features. Additionally, there may be an ambiguity in visual features if they
are shared between cameras. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.3. The corner
points from all the tiles on the °oor are the feature points automatically detected
and their correspondence between images is ambiguous. Thus, there are multiple
hypotheses that result for how the two cameras' ¯elds of view are related.
These examples demonstrate some of the challenges in automatically localizing
camera networks. In camera networks where there are wide baseline cameras the issue
that the common scene observed by two cameras will not necessarily look the same
between the cameras and this is a challenge. There will be no common appearance
cues and thus, we cannot use appearance-based features. Traditional image feature20
Figure 2.2: (Top Row) Images from two wide baseline cameras and it is di±cult to tell
how the cameras' ¯elds of view are related. (Bottom Row) Images from the same two
cameras with SIFT features applied and the matching shown. The matching is incorrect as
the static features in each image are not the same.
detection methods rely quite a bit on visual appearance and therefore will not work
given this case as are no similar static features between cameras and if there are, they
do not have the similar appearance. An additional challenge is that the cameras may
have some common appearance cues, but they are not unique enough to provide good
correspondence information to do localization. In light of these challenges, how do
we then ¯nd features which can be correlated across cameras?
One approach is to go back to manual intervention and manually measure the pose
or use a calibration pattern to do a semi-automatic localization. In [83], the authors
take this approach and use a point light source to calibrate cameras. Additionally the21
Figure 2.3: (Top Row) Images from two cameras. (Bottom Row) Images from the same
two cameras with SIFT features applied and the matching shown. The matching is incorrect
as the static features in each image are not unique enough to provide unique matches
between the images.
EasyCal Calibration Toolbox [2] uses a point light source to calibrate a network of
cameras. This is a semi-automatic method where the light source is manually moved
around in observation space of the cameras and creates common features points shared
by the cameras. This method requires conditions in which the light source can actually
be seen by the cameras as well as requiring time consuming manual intervention.
Manual methods are very tedious and time consuming and sometimes requires
special environmental conditions that may not be present in camera network setups.
In looking at how to create a fully automatic method that does not rely on appearance
feature similarity, there has been a movement towards looking at moving objects in22
the scene. When looking at dynamic scenes, a human can infer how the views from
cameras are related by looking at the consistency of the motion of objects between
the cameras. Looking at the scene with no moving objects in it, as shown in Figure
2.4, it is unclear how the cameras are oriented with respect to one another. However,
when a moving object enters the scene, as shown in Figure 2.5, it becomes more clear
how the cameras are positioned relative to one another.
Figure 2.4: Wide-baseline cameras with no moving objects in the scene
In [26], the authors use a statistical method to ¯nd the localization parameters of
the cameras. A known object is tracked over time and the image position at each time
is recorded and used as a means to solve for the localization parameters. However, it
is assumed that the object is known ahead of time and the height, the Z coordinate
of the position vector, of the cameras as well as two of their orientation parameters,23
Figure 2.5: Wide-baseline cameras with a moving object in the scene
are already known. Only the X-Y portion of the position vector and the orientation
around the principal axis of the camera are solved for. There is still an assumption
of one object in the scene making it easy to track and identify.
In [74, 20], the authors assume a common global ground plane between all cam-
eras. Within a single camera, detected objects are ¯t to a local ground plane and
then using homography constraints, these local ground planes are matched to a global
ground plane. In these works, how the camera is oriented to a local ground plane
is already known and the objects in time are used to provide the constraints for the
homographies and determine which camera ¯eld of view relates to which others. In
[11, 43], this ground plane concept is extended a bit, where the relation of the local
ground plane to the camera is not known, but solved for based on known objects and24
then these local ground planes are aligned to a global ground plane based on homogra-
phies. While these methods work well in certain settings, they are not generalizable
as it is not always the case that a common global ground plane exists and trying to
¯t one to the data from the cameras can lead in wrong localization parameters.
As with these previous work, we feel that using moving objects in the scene is key
to localizing cameras in a network, particularly in wide-baseline settings. Di®ering
from these authors, we take advantage of the actual motion of the objects in both the
spatial and the temporal space in order to create a general method that is independent
of the scene structure and does not rely upon known objects or a ¯xed number of
objects. The goal is that this general method can be adapted to take into account
any knowns, such as number of objects or scene structures like ground planes, if these
things are known. However, this method can also be used when there are none of these
givens and the structure of the scene and moving objects are unknown to estimate the
localization of the camera network. We use the dynamic scenes that current camera
networks can capture, and use the motion of objects in the scene as a cue to help with
localization. By looking at the consistency of motion between cameras, rather than
visually similar features, we demonstrate how localization of cameras can be done.
2.3 Challenges In Using Motion
In using moving objects in the scene and exploiting the fact that current camera
networks are able to capture and dynamic scene information, there exist challenges in25
how to use this data. First, since moving objects may have di®erent appearance cues,
other aspects of the moving objects must be exploited and used for localization. We
look at the spatio-temporal motion of the object in the image plane of each camera
as the feature(s) to use for correspondence between cameras in the geometric space
via the epipolar constraint.
This leads to the next challenge of how to represent the motion of objects in the
image plane? Should optical °ow be used and if so, how are °ow vectors compared?
How should motion be represented so it can be used e®ectively as a feature for local-
ization? Since °ow vectors are based o® of appearance and appearance varies between
cameras, we chose not to use optical °ow vectors as a measure of motion. Instead,
we abstract each moving object to a blob and then use the centroid of that blob over
time as a measure of motion . By associating the centroid of an object over time,
we build an object image track in each camera that observes the object and use this
as the motion feature. While the centroid of an object in one camera will not map
to exactly to the same 3D point of the centroid of the object in another camera, we
show that this does not introduce signi¯cant error. We also show that given some
more knowledge about the network setup, a point other than the centroid, can be
chosen on the objects in the image such that these image points do map to the same
3D point.
The ¯nal challenge is determining how to correlate the motion track features
between cameras. Should the shape of the track be used? Should the distance between26
points be used? Appearance cues cannot be relied upon and this must be avoided, so
instead we make use of geometric constraints that must be satis¯ed if two cameras
are related and use the points of the tracks as possible correspondences. Since the
motion tracks have already been built, this limits the possible correspondences and
also additional ¯ltering is done to narrow the possible correspondences by exploiting
the time synchronization of cameras in a network.
2.4 Contributions of Our Approach
If we are to automatically localize the cameras in a general network setup using
moving objects in the scene, we need to take full advantage of the commonalities
in camera network setup parameters, appearance cues withineach camera, and the
video quality data. We break the problem into a two step process. The ¯rst step is
an intra-camera step where a statistical approach is taken to determine the motion
of objects and build the motion tracks in each image plane. Each camera is treated
independently at this stage and the static background appearance and video rate
data is used to aid in picking out the moving objects to build the motion tracks. The
second step is an inter-camera step where geometric constraints are used to determine
the correspondence of motion tracks between cameras. Taking advantage of known
internal parameters of the cameras and synchronization, or time stamping on the
images, helps in the process.
Our approach stands in contrast to past work that recovers camera position, T, up27
to scale, and orientation, R, in a mulit-view setting. Previous works are based known
objects in a scene, known scene geometry with a common ground plane, and known
shared appearance features between cameras. Our method is quite general and can
be applied in a network with unknown scene geometry, camera layout, and objects, as
long as the moving objects can be detected and isolated. That we can get an estimate
of localization based on motion alone without scene knowledge and appearance cues,
is a strong testament to the importance of these cues and a data-driven approach.
One key idea in our method is to not focus on particular object or motions, but
just detect all moving objects in the scene and let the statistical data association
method ¯lter out noisy movements. Those moving objects with a small motion, such
as tree swaying in the wind, will not have a path built by data association. Therefore,
small background motions can be eliminated.
A second key idea in this work is to not focus on the detailed motion of the moving
object, but instead, treat the object as a whole entity and look at the overall motion.
While the moving objects in the scene may be rigid or non-rigid, no di®erentiation
between the two is done. Each object is treated as a whole and the overall motion
is looked at, not the speci¯cs of the motion such as might be given by °ow vectors.
This allows an overall motion track of the object in the image plane to be created
and to use as a feature. While the non-rigid motions may introduce some noise into
the measurement, the data association method used to build the motion tracks has
an adjustment step that does a best ¯t and can eliminate some of the noise.28
A third key idea in this method is to break the problem into an intra-camera step
and an inter-camera step. This two step approach takes advantage of consistencies
within a single camera that do not exist between cameras. The fast frame rate and
consistency in visual motion that exist in a single camera between frames is exploited.
Our contributions with this approach of using motion consistency of objects in
combination with geometric constraints of projection to provide for the automatic
localization of the cameras in a network as follows:
² Breaking the problem into intra-camera and inter-camera steps
² Using moving objects and their spatial and temporal aspects as features within
each camera (Intra-Camera Step)
{ Treating moving objects as a whole
{ Building tracks using the moving objects within the image plane of each
camera
² Using the tracks from each camera as features to compare between cameras
(Inter-Camera Step)
{ Relation of tracks to geometric projection
Additionally, we show how our method using moving objects for localization can
be combined with information from radio sensors for complete extrinsic calibration
of the cameras in the network. We present a fusion-based localization method which29
combines the visual data with the radio data from radio inferometry in order to solve
for the position, R, and the orientation, T, of each camera and the scale factor, ¸.
Since no previously existing datasets are appropriate to test our localization
method on, as either they have no motion or do not have a ground truth to com-
pare results against, we use new data sets based on both simulated and real camera
networks of varying size. In testing our visual localization method we created a simu-
lated camera network environment in matlab and then used four di®erent real camera
network setups ranging in size from 2 to 6 cameras. An indoor lab setup consisting of
two cameras, an indoor building setup consisting of 3 cameras, an outdoor network
consisting of two cameras, and an outdoor setup consisting of 6 cameras are all used.
To test our extension of the visual localization to the fusion-based localization that
uses radio information as well, we use an outdoor setup that consists of 6 cameras
and 6 radio sensors.30
Chapter 3
Localization Using Object Image
Tracks
We will be known forever by the tracks we leave.
American Indian Proverb, Dakota
To localize the cameras in the network we use the moving objects in the scene
in order to deal with the previously mentioned complexities that appearance-based
features create with modern camera network setups. In each camera, we build tracks
of the moving objects, as they appear in that camera's image plane, which we call
object image tracks. These object image tracks are then used as features for deter-
mining localization. In this chapter, we describe our method of localization using
object image tracks, originally presented in [53]. We present the necessary assump-
tions on the network in order to use this method and describe both the inter-camera
and intra-camera steps used in determining the orientation and translation, up to31
scale, of pairs of cameras.
3.1 Problem Formulation
For this method of localization, the assumptions on the inputs and outputs are:
² Input: synchronized video sequences from the N ¯xed cameras in the network
which are at unknown positions and orientations and known internal calibration
parameters for all cameras
² Output: The orientation, R 2 SO3£3 and the position, up to scale factor,
T 2 R3 for all N cameras.
No prior assumptions on where the N cameras are placed are made except that
there must be some ¯eld of view overlap between pairs of cameras if the orientation, up
to scale, and position of those cameras are to be recovered. Further, no assumptions
on the scene structure are made. For example, the cameras may be wide baseline
and, if there exists a common ground plane, no prior knowledge of how each camera's
coordinate frame is related to that ground is known. No prior correspondences of
features between cameras is known, nor are any assumptions that the same static
scene features must appear in multiple cameras.
With this approach the goal is to ¯nd correspondences between cameras given that
the baseline and photometric characteristics can vary considerably between images
from di®erent cameras. Thus, one cannot necessarily use brightness or proximity32
constraints and traditional methods of features correspondence, such as SIFT features
[45] or Salient Region [87] will not necessarily work for localization. However, by
observing moving objects in the scene, this information can be used in order to localize
the cameras.
Our localization method consists of two main steps in order to use individual raw
video streams to localize the cameras: an intra-camera step and an inter-camera step.
The intra-camera step, which is called track formation, involves exploiting similarities
of objects between frames for each camera separately. The inter-camera step, which
is called track matching, involves using the object image tracks from each camera as
features to compare against object image tracks from other cameras. Without loss of
generality, the following variables are de¯ned as:
N: the number of cameras in the network
Ci: the ith camera in the network where i 2 1;2;:::;N
P: the set of moving objects in the scene
pt
i: where pt
i µ P are the subset of objects Ci observes at time t
£i: the set of object image tracks for camera Ci
Rij: the relative orientation of Ci with respect to Cj
Tij: the relative position, up to scale, of Ci with respect to Cj
An overview of the inter-camera and intra-camera steps are as follows:
1. Track Formation: Find moving objects in each camera's ¯eld of view and
based on correspondences between frames, build tracks of those objects within
the image plane as shown in ¯gure 3.1.
For this step, each camera, Ci, observes some set of objects, pt
i, at each time t.
No assumptions are made on what objects are seen by which cameras nor what33
type of objects can be seen. For example, humans, cars, and dogs could all be
types of moving objects seen by the cameras.
Additionally, it is assumed that the frame rate of the cameras are fast enough
to pick up the motion of objects moving in the scene. Within a single camera,
Ci, moving objects, pt
i, are found and tracks of these objects within the image
plane, £i, are built based on multi-target tracking. This is discussed in more
detail in section 3.2.
2. Track Matching: The image tracks, £i, from each camera are used as features
to compare against image tracks from another cameras in order to determine
the relative (Rij;Tij) of each camera. This comparison is done in a pair wise
manner and is based o® of correspondences and the properties of the essential
matrix. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.1.
Multiple view geometry is well studied. For two views there exist geometric
constraints that relate the corresponding points in the 3D camera geometry,
which come about in the epipolar constraint. Since the the internal parameters
of all cameras are known, the focus here is on the essential matrix, based o®
the epipolar constraint. A detailed description of the epipolar constraint can
be found in [46].
Once object image tracks in each camera have been recovered, these tracks are
used as spatio-temporal features. These spatio-temporal features are compared34
between each pair of cameras to get a the relative orientation and position,
(Rij;Tij), based on the essential matrix. This is discussed in more detail in
section 3.2.1
(a)Camera 1 (b)Camera 2
Figure 3.1: Track formation: formation of tracks based on object motion in two separate
cameras.
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Figure 3.2: Track Matching: (a) shows the tracks in a single camera (b) shows the tracks
from another camera over the same time period and(c) shows the correct track matchings
between the two cameras that is used in the epipolar constraint.35
3.2 Intra-Camera Track Formation
The intra-camera step is done for each camera Ci independently in order to form
the object image track set £i. Filtering the video data in order to ¯nd the moving
objects in each camera's ¯eld of view is the necessary ¯rst step. An adaptive back-
ground subtraction technique is applied in order to segment moving objects. We use
the method proposed by [99], which is an adaptive background subtraction method,
in order to do this segmentation. Items that are determined as foreground objects
are considered to be possible moving objects in the scene.
After the background segmentation is run, the remaining foreground objects are
further ¯ltered. Bounding boxes are formed around each foreground object. If a
bounding box is too close to the boundary of the image, based on a threshold of q
pixels, this object is ¯ltered out and not counted in the ¯nal set, pi, of moving objects
for Ci for that frame. This is done to help make the track formation more robust
as only the centroids of fully seen objects will be used. Only the foreground objects
that lie completely within the image are treated as the true moving objects. Thus,
for each camera Ci we get some set of moving objects pt
i at each time instance t.
For each moving object in the frame of a camera, the centroid of that object
is computed. This leads to a set of centroids, Mt
i, for each frame of camera Ci .
The centroids of the objects are then used as the measurements for the multi-target
tracking in order to build object image tracks.
In recent years, multi-target tracking has received a considerable amount of atten-36
tion in the computer vision community because the task of tracking multiple objects
in video sequences is an important step towards understanding dynamic scenes. The
essence of the multi-target tracking problem is to ¯nd a track of each object from
the noisy measurements. If the sequence of measurements associated with each ob-
ject is known, multi-target tracking reduces to a set of state estimation problems, for
which many e±cient algorithms are available. Unfortunately, the association between
measurements and objects is unknown. The data association problem is to work out
which measurements were generated by which objects; more precisely, we require a
partition of measurements such that each element of a partition is a collection of mea-
surements generated by a single object or clutter [81]. Due to this data association
problem, the complexity of the posterior distribution of the states of objects grows
exponentially as time progresses. It is well-known that the data association problem
is NP-hard [16, 72], so we do not expect to ¯nd e±cient, exact algorithms for solving
this problem. The problem gets more challenging with video sequences due to the
nonlinear camera projection, occlusions, and varying appearances, to name a few.
Since cameras are not calibrated, we cannot use the 3D model-based tracking
approaches such as [34, 21]. However, we can still track moving objects on a 2D image
plane. In addition, the computational complexity of the model-based approach, e.g.,
[21], is not desirable for our rapid autonomous calibration task.
In order to handle highly nonlinear and non-Gaussian dynamics and observations,
a number of methods based on particle ¯lters has been recently developed to track37
multiple objects in video [34, 66, 38]. Although particle ¯lters are highly e®ective
in single-target tracking, it is reported that they provide poor performance in multi-
target tracking [38]. It is because a ¯xed number of particles is insu±cient to represent
the posterior distribution with the exponentially increasing complexity (due to the
data association problem). As shown in [38, 98], an e±cient alternative is to use
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to handle the data association problem in multi-
target tracking.
For our problem, there is an additional complexity. We do not assume the number
of objects is known. A single-scan approach, which updates the posterior based only
on the current scan of measurements, can be used to track an unknown number of
targets with the help of trans-dimensional MCMC [98, 38] or a detection algorithm
[66]. But a single-scan approach cannot maintain tracks over long periods because it
cannot revisit previous, possibly incorrect, association decisions in the light of new
evidence. This issue can be addressed by using a multi-scan approach, which updates
the posterior based on both current and past scans of measurements. The well-known
multiple hypothesis tracking (MHT) [18, 75] is a multi-scan tracker, however, it is not
widely used due to its high computational complexity.
A newly developed algorithm, called Markov chain Monte Carlo data association
(MCMCDA), provides a computationally desirable alternative to MHT [64]. The
simulation study in [64] showed that MCMCDA was computationally e±cient com-
pared to MHT with heuristics (i.e., pruning, gating, clustering, N-scan-back logic38
and k-best hypotheses). In this paper, we use the online version of MCMCDA to
track multiple objects in a 2D image plane. Due to the page limitation, we omit the
description of the algorithm in this paper and refer interested readers to [65] or [64].
3.2.1 Inter-Camera Track Matching and Correspondence
Once £i has been determined for each camera, these object image tracks are then
treated as spatio-temporal features. The inter-camera step looks at the correspon-
dence between these features for each pair of cameras.
For a given time period t0 : tn:
(Ci;Cj):pair of cameras where i 6= j
µm
i 2 £i: is a speci¯c track in camera Ci where m 2 f1;:::;j£ijg
ts(µm
i ): starting time of a track µm
i 2 £i
te(µm
i ): ending time of a track µm
i 2 £i
where t0 · ts(µi) < te(µi) · tn;8µi 2 £i.
In doing pair-wise correspondence with object images tracks, between a pair of
cameras (Ci;Cj), we see use (£i;£j) for possible correspondences. It is important to
note that it is possible just to use the centroids of the moving objects from all the
frames alone, without forming tracks, as features and do point correspondences using
these points. However, forming the object image tracks by using data association
is much more bene¯cial. By using the intra-camera data association step, the space
of possible correspondences is cut down as multiple points in one track are limited
to corresponding to multiple points in another single track only, not separate points39
from multiple tracks. For example, looking at the pair (Ci;Cj), if the ¯rst point
on the track µ1
i corresponds to a point on µ1
j, then then another point µ1
i cannot
correspond to a di®erent track, such as µ2
j. Additionally, using the track constrains
the correspondence space further based on timing data from the on the tracks. Only
tracks which have an overlap in time can correspond. Using the object image tracks
from the intra-camera data association, thus greatly reduces computation time and
further constrains the (R;T) of the cameras, leading us to a more accurate solution.
In doing pair-wise correspondence with object images tracks, the ¯rst step is
to determine if there are enough tracks that overlap in time between the camera
pair (Ci;Cj). A pair of tracks (thetam
i ;thetan
j) between (Ci;Cj) overlap if there is a
su±cient intersection in the sets of track times:
jts(µ
m
i );::;te(µ
m
i )
\
ts(µ
n
j );:::;te(µ
n
j )j ¸ 8 (3.1)
De¯ne ª : (£i;£j) to be the process which ¯nds all pairs of the possible overlapping
tracks and © to be the results set of overlapping pairs, with Ám 2 © to be a single
pair. Once all pairs of overlapping tracks have been found, the ¯rst pair is used to
¯nd an essential matrix. Using this essential matrix, de¯ned as Em, the reprojection
error for the remaining possible corresponding track pairs is calculated. Those pairs
with a reprojection error under a given threshold, g, are deemed as good correspon-
dences for Em. De¯ne ­(Em) to be the process which ¯nds the set,¡, of all the good40
corresponding pairs, °¾, where ¾ 2 1;2;::;¹ and the total number of good correspon-
dences for the Em is ¹. This can be thought of a pseudo-RANSAC process using
tracks instead the traditional points. An example of this candidate matching can be
seen in Figure 3.3.
The Em corresponding to the °¾ with the largest ¹ is deemed to be the essential
matrix that best represents how the ¯elds of view of Ci andCj are related to each
other. It is then a well known step to recover the extrinsic parameters, Rij andTij
from the essential matrix [46].
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.3: Candidate Matching: (a) illustrates the possible correspondences between
tracks in two cameras; (b) illustrates one matching of overlapping tracks that does not
qualify as a candidate match as only 3 tracks match up; and (c) illustrates a good candidate
match of overlapping tracks.
The pseudo code for the whole process is as shown in Figure 3.2.1:
A natural question to ask is whether tracks based on the centroid of an object
will actually correspond to the same points in space when dealing with the epipolar
constraint. If the segmentation is perfect and the objects are spheres, then the cen-41
Algorithm 3.2.1: Localization(rawvideo)
for t Ã 1 to tmax
for eachCi, build object tracks
for each pair (Ci;Cj)
do ¯nd candidate matches using ª(Ci;Cj)
^ j¡j = NULL
^ Eij = NULL
if j©j ¸ 2
do
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
8Á 2 ©
Find E
¯nd good matches using ­(E)
if j¡j > ^ j¡j ^ Eij = E
^ j¡j = j¡j
return (allEij)42
troids of the segmented objects do in fact correspond to the same points in space.
Yet most objects do not have this nice property nor can be segmented out perfectly
in the image such as people, cars, dogs, and other types of moving objects often in
scenes. However, as an upper bound on the error, we know that the true centroid of
the object will be inside the convex hull of the silhouette segmented out. Our results
show that there the reprojective error in the results is very small and the estimates
for all (R;T) are within 8 degrees, in both position and orientation, of the ground
truth results.
3.3 Experiments
We tested our method of localization using object image tracks in four di®erent
setups.
3.3.1 Matlab Simulated Network
In this setup, we simulated objects moving through a scene observed by a simu-
lated camera network in MATLAB. Seven camera views were simulated and di®erent
size cubes were used as the moving objects in the environment. Perspective projection
and triangular ¯elds of view were used for the simulated cameras. All measurements
had gaussian noise of N(0;1) added to them. The camera setup can be seen in Figures
3.4a and 3.4b.43
(a) (b)
Figure 3.4: Simulated Camera Networks. (a) a 3D perspective view of the network. (b)
and overhead view of the network.
Using the ground truth to compare measurement for the corners of the cubes,
the reprojection error in the estimated measurements for the corners was o® by an
average of 1 pixel.
3.3.2 Lab Camera Network with Two Cameras
In this setup, two Logitech QuickCam 4000 webcams were setup in a lab room
observing an open area. The cameras captured 5 frames per second with an image
size of 320 x 240. Three minutes of video were taken in total. Rigid objects were
moved through the area and observed by the cameras. This can be seen in Figure
3.5. Since we already had the knowledge that the camera network was looking at a
common ground plane, we solved for the homography between the cameras, instead
of the essential matrix [46]. This setup let us test the algorithm on rigid objects of
moving in a plane.
We obtained ground truth external camera parameters for this setup by turning44
Figure 3.5: Lab camera network with rigid objects
o® the lights and using a point light source to obtain consistent feature points. The
average reprojection error using the results from the homography was 1.1 pixel.
3.3.3 Building Camera Network with Three Cameras
In this setup two Logitech Orbit MP cameras along with a Logitech QuickCam
4000 camera were setup on the second °oor of an atrium looking down on the °oor
below. The cameras observed people walking through the space. This can be seen
in Figure 3.6. This setup let us test the algorithm on articulated objects of di®erent
sizes and speeds moving through a space.
Tracks of people walking on the ¯rst °oor were used to localize the cameras.
Three di®erent sequences of 60 seconds of video footage were used. As we had45
Figure 3.6: Building camera network. (Top Row) Views from the three cameras without
objects in the scene. (Bottom Row) Views from the same three cameras observing people
walking.
control over the environment, ground truth for the position and orientation of the
cameras was obtained using a point light source and using the method cited in the
EasyCal Calibration Toolbox [2].
The resulting error in the estimated position, up to scale, can be seen in Figure 3.7
and the estimated orientation error can be seen in Figure 3.8. The center camera's
coordinate frame was chosen as the world coordinate frame and the right and left
cameras aligned to the center camera's coordinate frame in the global recovery step.
It can be seen that the error in the estimation of the localization parameters is small
even using the centroids of the objects in the scene.46
camera sequence 1 sequence 2 sequence 3
Right 5.04 6.22 5.81
Left 4.11 7.68 5.91
Center 0 0 0
Figure 3.7: Position Error: The error in the estimated position, up to scale, from the
tracks is given in degrees here. The coordinate frame of the center camera is chosen as the
world coordinate frame and all other coordinate frames are aligned to this.
camera sequence 1 sequence 2 sequence 3
Right 1.42 3.67 2.84
Left 2.13 2.56 3.21
Center 0 0 0
Figure 3.8: Orientation Error: The error in the estimated orientation from the tracks is
given in degrees here. The coordinate frame of the center camera is chosen as the world
coordinate frame and all other coordinate frames are aligned to this.
3.3.4 Outdoor Camera Mote Network with Two Cameras
In this setup two Citrix camera motes were placed in second story windows looking
down on a courtyard. The Citrix camera motes were synchronized within a few frames
of each other and people walking in the courtyard were observed. This is shown in
Figure 3.10.
We positioned two camera motes 8.5 feet apart and pointed them at an open
area where people were walking, as shown by the top row of pictures in Figure 3.11.
Each camera mote ran background subtraction on its current image and then sent
the bounding box coordinates back to the base station for each detected foreground47
Figure 3.9: Real Camera Network: (Top Row) Images from the cameras with no moving
objects. (Middle Row) Images from on data set with tracks of moving objects shown over
time. (Bottom Row): Images from on data set with tracks of moving objects shown over
time
object. The center of each bounding box was used to build the image tracks over time
on the base station computer, as shown in Figure 4.6. It can be seen that multiple
tracks are successfully estimated from the image sequence.
Our localization method is particularly suitable for a low-bandwidth camera net-
work because only the coordinates of the foreground objects need to be transmitted,
not entire images. In implementing the localization, tracks from the two image se-48
Figure 3.10: Camera Mote Views. (Top Row) View of the courtyard without any moving
objects. (Bottom Row) View of the courtyard observing people.
Figure 3.11: (Top) Image frames from the left and right camera motes, respectively,
viewing the scene. (Bottom) The detected foreground objects from the scene.49
Figure 3.12: The tracks of the moving objects in the image planes of the left and right
camera motes, respectively, formed by MCMCDA.
quences are compared, and minimized reprojection error and assumed a common
ground plane to determine which tracks best correspond between images. We used 43
frames from the cameras at an image resolution of 640£480. Foreground objects were
detected in 22 of the 43 frames and tracks were built o® these detected foreground
objects. Four tracks were built in the ¯rst camera and ¯ve tracks were built in the
second camera. Using the adapted localization method, we were able to determine the
localization of the two cameras relative to one another with an average reprojection
error of 4.94 pixels. This was based on the matching of four tracks between the two
cameras which minimize the reprojection error.
The accuracy of the camera localization estimate is a®ected by a few factors.
First, the choice of the (low-cost) camera has an e®ect on the quality of the captured
image. Second, the precision of the synchronization between the cameras a®ects50
Figure 3.13: (Left) The matching of tracks between the cameras that were used for
localization. (Right) The reprojection error measured in pixels for each of the 20 points of
the tracks.
the accuracy of the image correspondence as the frames synchronization was o® by
approximately 2 seconds. Last, we only used a small number of frames to estimate
track correspondence. Using a longer image sequence with more data points can
reduce the estimation error.51
Chapter 4
Full External Calibration Using
Data Fusion
In union there is strength.
Aesop
Our method of localizing based on object image tracks provides an automatic way
get localization up to a scale factor on the translation vector, i.e., the position of each
camera is only recovered up to scale. However, image data alone, no matter what
automatic feature is used, is not su±cient to do full external calibration of a camera
network in an unknown environment because it only recovers the baseline up to scale.
In this chapter, we explain a fusion-based method of full external calibration, as ¯rst
presented in [52], recovering (R;T) and the scale factor ¸, for all cameras in the
network. By extending our method based on object image tracks and fusing it with
radio information, we are able to do recover estimates of the full external parameters52
of the camera network. We develop both a linear and a non-linear approach to
fuse the image data and the radio interferometry data in order to fully localize the
camera network. This Fusion-Based Localization (FBL), or full external calibration,
can recover both the orientation of camera's ¯elds of view as well as their complete
positions.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Suppose that we have N cameras in the network. We assume that all the cameras
are time-synchronized and each camera is equipped with a radio for wireless commu-
nication. Each camera is assumed to have the capability of detecting features, F, in
the scene as well as having some overlap in what it sees with another camera in the
network for correspondence. While feature correspondence in image data can be used
to determine the orientation of a camera relative to another camera that overlaps,
the position can only be determined up to scale due to the geometry constraints on
the epipoles. Due to this, multiple set of possible positions of cameras will results
from the same set of images.
Using image data alone, without previous knowledge on the scene or objects mov-
ing through the scene, we can localize the cameras except for scale factors, ¸i on the
vectors, Ti, that relate to the position of each camera Ci. With three overlapping
cameras which see the same moving objects at the same time and with su±cient mo-
tion, we can recover the scale factor. However, this is not typical in many networks53
Figure 4.1: The structure of the data fusion localization method.
and puts further constraints on how the cameras in a network can be places. To
recover these scale factors, we instead look to incorporating another type data from
the low-bandwidth sensor network community. Since radios are often found in in-
corporated with other sensors in a network and have become the common means for
localizing low-bandwidth networks, it is reasonable for us to look to using this type
of information to recover the scale factors involved when localizing camera networks.
The omnidirectional radios on a wireless node can transmit and receive data but
they do not provide directional information. By communicating with one another, the
radio nodes can use signal interference to determine linear combination of distances
between groups of nodes. Note that the orientations of cameras can not be solved54
using radio data alone.
Our FBL method solves for the complete localization of a camera network, ¯nding
both the orientation of the ¯elds of view of each camera as well as the positions of
cameras including the scale factor by using q-ranges, fdijklg, computed from the radio
interferometry; and the relative orientations, fRijg, and positions up to scale, fTijg,
from the image object image track localization method from Chapter 3. The structure
of the FBL method is shown in Figure 4.1. We develop a non-linear fusion method
can to ¯nd the resulting scale factor so the position of the cameras are fully known.
Given additional parameters, I show that a computationally e±cient linear fusion
method can be used.
4.2 Overview Radio Inferometry
The Radio Interferometric Positioning System (RIPS) was proposed in [48] for
node localization using the phase measurements of the radio signals with low cost
hardware. The basic idea behind RIPS is to utilize two transmitter nodes to cre-
ate an interference signal. The two nodes transmit sine waves at slightly di®erent
frequencies at the same time, creating a composite interference signal with a low fre-
quency envelope. This interference frequency can be measured by cheap and simple
hardware available on a wireless sensor node.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of the interference signal and its low frequency beats
at nodes C and D. The model of the radio interference was developed in [48]. The55
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Figure 4.2: Two transmitters A and B transmit at the same time at two close frequencies.
The interfere signal is observed by receivers C and D. Figure from [48].
phase o®set of the interference signals received at two di®erent receivers can be ex-
pressed in terms of a quantity called the q-range, which is a linear combination of
distances between the two transmitters and two receivers de¯ned as
qABCD = dAD ¡ dBD + dBC ¡ dAC
An important theorem on q-range presented in [48] states that the relative phase
o®set of received interference signals at nodes C and D are related to q-range as
follows
'CD = 2¼
qABCD
c=f
(mod 2¼); (4.1)
and f = fA + fB, where fA;fB are carrier frequencies of transmitters A and B, and56
c is speed of light.
Another important result presented in [41] states that in a network of n wireless
nodes, there exist a maximum of n(n ¡ 3)=2 linearly independent q-ranges. It was
shown that by taking independent q-range measurements for di®erent combinations
of four nodes, it is possible to reconstruct the relative location of the nodes. An
algorithm and implementation for localization were presented in [48].
The main bene¯t of RIPS lies in the fact that it does not require any additional
hardware because common radio transceivers can be utilized for phase measurements.
By using the q-ranges we now have distances that can be used in conjunction with
the Rij's and Tij's we found from the image data. We now need to combine these two
sets of information to determine the position of the cameras.
4.3 Fusion-based Localization
While neither q-ranges alone nor image data alone have enough information to
completely localize the cameras, fusing the two sets of information gives us complete
localization. Here we present both a linear method and a nonlinear method for solving
this data fusion problem. The linear method has a unique solution, but requires
certain conditions on the topology of the camera network. If these conditions are not
met, the nonlinear method can be used for complete localization.57
4.3.1 Linear Method
For a network of N cameras, there exist N(N¡3)=2 independent q-range equations
[41]. We also know, given the network, that there are N(N ¡ 1)=2 possible pairings
of cameras, thus N(N ¡ 1)=2 pairwise scales on position, ¸ij, exist. In addition to
the N(N ¡ 3)=2 independent q-range equations, N more independent equations are
necessary in order to solve for all the ¸ij. We look to the camera position vectors, Tij,
where i 6= j 2 1;:::;k and where k · N to provide us with these additional equations.
Using the available Tij, we want to ¯nd equations such that we can use the vector
notation and the unknown scales to write one Tij, with it's unknown scale ¸ij, as a
sum of Tkl and ¸kl and Tmn and ¸mn such that ij 6= kl 6= mn. For example, Figure
4.3, the unit translation vector T13 can be written as:
¸13T13 = ¸12T12 + ¸23T23 (4.2)
If we take this equation and write it in terms of the unknown scales, ¸ij we get:
[T12 T12 ¡ T13]
2
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Figure 4.3: The overlap in ¯elds of view between the cameras nodes based on the object
image tracks
As can be seen, the matrix [T12 T23 ¡ T13] is not full rank and [¸12 ¸23 ¸13]T
lies in the null space of the matrix. Thus, we can only get at most, two independent
equations from using Equation 4.3. Additionally, it can be seen that a clique of three
cameras all being able to view one another, is needed to write this type of equation,
in order to write one Tij in terms of other Tij. Therefore, in addition to the set of
independent q-range equations, we need N equations from the camera network which
means N=2 cliques of three cameras need to exist in the camera network.
If enough cliques are found in the camera network, then we can write the unknown
scales, ¸ij in terms of the q-ranges and translations Tij as a linear system:59
Ax = b (4.4)
where
b =
·
d1234 d1324 0 0 0 0
¸T
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¸T
Thus, given enough cliques of three cameras in a network which have overlapping
¯elds of view such that all Tij can be found for that clique, a linear method exists to
solve for the scales ¸ij as shown in Equation 4.4.
4.3.2 Nonlinear
A unique solution can be found from the linear method if certain conditions exist
in the camera network. However, when these conditions are not present, we must60
rely on a nonlinear method. We have developed a nonlinear method to solve for the
external calibration parameters in a general camera network setup.
From the localization algorithm described in Chapter 3 we have a set of pairs of
camera nodes with overlapping ¯eld-of-views (FoV). Lets denote the set as,
O = f(Ci;Cj) : Ci has overlapping FoV with Cj;i 6= jg
For a camera pair ok = (Ci;Cj) 2 O, denote scaling factor between camera nodes Ci
and Cj as ¸k. We also know the relative rotation matrix and unit translation vector
for the pair. Let the rotation matrix denoted as Ri
ij and the unit translation vector
as, T
i
ij. Assuming the camera network is connected, we can compute the rotation
matrices for each of the camera nodes in a common frame of reference. Without loss of
generality, lets consider reference frame of node 1 as the global reference frame. With
successive multiplications of the relative rotation matrices we can compute absolute
rotation matrices Ri1 for i > 1 as:
Ri1 = Ri11 £ Ri2i1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Riin
where f1;i1;i2;¢¢¢ ;in;ig is a path from node 1 to node i. For i = 1 the rotation
matrix is an identity matrix of size 3.
Using the unit translation vectors, absolute rotation matrices and the scaling61
factor for each pair, we can compute vector for pair ok in the frame of 1 as:
x
1
ij = Ri1 £ T
i
ij £ ¸k
The camera node locations in the global reference frame can be computed as:
x
1
i = x1 + x
1
1i1 + x
1
i1i2 + ¢¢¢ + x
1
ini
where f1;i1;i2;¢¢¢ ;in;ig is a path from node 1 to node i, and x1 = [0;0;0]T.
Both vectors x1
ij and x1
i are functions of the scaling factors ¸, i.e. x1
ij = Ri1£T
i
ij£
¸k , Fij(¸k), and x1
i , Gi(¸). Hence, the distance between all other camera pairs
that are not members of the set O can also be represented as a function of scaling
factors as:
dij = jjGi(¸) ¡ Gj(¸)jj , Hij(¸)
The q-ranges de¯ned in section 4.2, which are linear combinations of distances can62
also be expressed as functions of scaling factors as:
qabcd = dad ¡ dac + dbc ¡ dbd
= Had(¸) ¡ Hac(¸) + Hbc(¸) ¡ Hbd(¸)
, Qabcd(¸)
The problem can be expressed as a non-linear least squares problem as:
minimize L(¸) =
X
abcd2T
(Qabcd(¸) ¡ ~ qabcd)
2
where T is the set of q-range tuples, ~ qabcd is the measured q-range for tuple abcd.
4.4 Experiments using Outdoor Camera Network
with Six Cameras
In this section, we apply our fusion method on real data. The algorithm is tested
on an outdoor deployment of a network of cameras. Using both the camera images and
the radio data we are able to estimate the position and orientation of the cameras.
The network consists of Linux PCs equipped with Logitech Quick Cam Pro 4000
cameras, and XSM wireless sensor motes. Six camera nodes and 7 XSM motes are
used. The ground truth location of the cameras+XSM motes is show in ¯g 4.4. The
cameras have a resolution of 240 x 320 pixels and acquired images at 8 frames per63
second(fps). 12 minutes of data is taken from the cameras for localization. Multiple
types of objects moved through the scene during this recording from planes to people.
An example of the di®erent objects is shown in Figure 4.5
Figure 4.4: An overhead view of the layout of the cameras
We use the existing TinyOS implementation of RIPS developed at Vanderbilt. The
TinyOS implementation running on 7 XSM motes and a Java application running on
base station provide us with the required q-range measurements. For more detail of
RIPS and its implementation we refer reader to [41].
The steps of the automatic method applied are as follows. Adaptive background
subtraction is applied to each image to obtain the foreground objects. Bounding
boxes are created around the foreground object and if a bounding boxe is located at
the edge of an image, the foreground object is not considered for further processing
to build object image track. The reason this check is implemented in the algorithm64
Figure 4.5: Some of the moving foreground objects in the scene as observed from camera
101
is because a bounding box at the edge of the image could indicate that part of the
foreground objects it getting occluded and thus the centroid would not be unstable.
Using the remaining centroids from the bounding boxes, object image tracks are
built using MCMCDA. In our method, the number tracks needed is de¯ned to be
at least 4 seconds long to further constrain the paths used and so each track had to
have at least 32 points due to the frame rate. This parameter in the algorithm can
be adjusted as desired.
The tracks from the centroids are then used for feature correspondence between
the cameras using the epipolar constraint and R and T, up to scale, solved using
SVD. Figure 4.7 shows what cameras are visually connected given the correspondence65
Camera 101 Camera 102 Camera 107
Camera 108 Camera 104 Camera 106
Figure 4.6: (Top) Object image tracks for frames 1 through 500 for cameras which had
correspondence in their respective tracks (Bottom) Object image tracks for frames 1 through
500 for cameras that did not have correspondence with the top row cameras, but which had
correspondence with each other.
between object image tracks. As can be seen, cameras 104 and 106 are disjoint from
the rest of the network. While their ¯elds of view overlap with each other, they are
not connected to the rest of the network. We verify this is correct based on the ground
truth of the setup. The average reprojection error for all camera pairs is < 3 pixels.
Using the Tij's for all overlapping camera pairs, this is fed into both an automatic
nonlinear and linear methods along with the q-ranges obtained from the XSM motes.
The resulting scale factors are shown in Table 4.1.
It should be noted that linear method solves for all scaling factors even if the
camera pair does not have overlapping ¯eld-of-view.66
Figure 4.7: The overlap in ¯elds of view between the cameras nodes based on the object
image tracks
Camera Pair Ground
Truth
Nonlinear
Esti-
mate
Linear
Estimate
101 to 102 3.7417 3.2376 4.2593
101 to 107 15.0326 15.5074 13.5940
101 to 108 12.9797 13.2370 13.1016
102 to 107 17.8260 15.4361 14.9415
102 to 108 16.2440 { 15.4440
107 to 108 3.8179 3.6743 1.5795
Table 4.1: The scale factors for the distances between cameras.67
Chapter 5
Localization Discussion
The eye sees what it brings the power to see.
Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881)
Our work is one step toward using dynamic information to do data correlation in
camera networks. By localizing the cameras in a network, this can aid as stepping
stone for higher level algorithms to take advantage of to better understand the visual
data in the network and operate the network more e±ciently. In this ¯nal chapter,
we discuss how if there is more information known ahead of time about the network
setup, how this can be taken into account in our localization method. Additionally,
we discuss further steps towards data correlation in these camera networks.68
5.1 Incorporating Known Parameters
The continuing focus of this localization work is that it is important and how to
provide a general method that is not restricted to speci¯c camera network setups or
known scene information. Yet, our method can easily be adapted to take into account
more known parameters if this information is present. Here we give an overview of
some of the varying parameters that can be known ahead of time about the camera
network or the environment and how these ¯t in to our general method for localization.
Single Object: If it is known ahead of time that only a single object will be
moving through the environment, this simpli¯es the inter-camera track matching and
correspondence of the localization method. When the object is a known objects with
known features, this additionally simpli¯es the intra-camera track formation portion
of the method.
An instance where a single object may occur is when a known object is placed
into the scene, for example a robot, which navigates and is tracked given known
features. While there may be other moving objects in the scene during this time,
only the known object will be detected, based on the known features of this object,
and considered for track formation. This simpli¯es the intra-camera track formation
step as more constraints are put on detection moving objects to be considered for
track formation. Only the known object is detected, based on it's features, for track
formation based and tracks are formed o® this single object.
Another example of when a single object might occur is when it is known ahead69
of time that there is only one object moving in through the scene due to speci¯c
scene constraints, such as a narrow space or patterns of motion. While this object
was not placed in to the scene and known a priori, it is known that there is only one
object and this again simpli¯es the localization algorithm as there is only one object
considered as a moving object for the method.
If there is only one object considered to be a moving object for the localization
method, then the intra-camera track formation only builds tracks of this single object.
The inter-camera track matching and correlation is then greatly simpli¯ed. The
process ª : (£i;£j), does not have to be run as the track matching is a given as
long as the tracks from di®erent cameras have an overlap in time. Additionally, when
tracks overlap in time, we know they are a correct match, as they are corresponding
to the same moving object, thus the ­(Em) process does not need to be done. The
essential matrix E can just bet determined straight away from the correspondences
formed from the overlapping tracks.
Global Ground Plane: When the scene structure is known ahead of time and it
is a given that a global ground plane exists between cameras, then this can be taken
into account in the inter-camera matching and correlation step. Instead of using
­(Em) and looking at the space of essential matrices, since there is a global ground
plane we can instead look for a homography between the cameras instead of the
essential matrix [46]. All processes in the inter-camera matching and correlation step
that deal with the essential matrix will instead deal with the homography instead.70
We demonstrated this in our experimental results section with in 3.3.2.
Limited Static Features: When a set of static features and their correspon-
dences between cameras is known, yet these are not enough to solve for the localization
of the cameras, these can be used in the inter-camera matching and correspondence
portion of the method. Since the correspondences of these static features is known,
they must be upheld by the essential matrix. In the inter-camera matching and
correlation step, once an estimate, Em, this estimate can be used to calculate the
reprojection error for the static correspondences. Since these static correspondences
are known, an essential matrix Em which minimized the reprojection error on these
correspondences as well as the tracks is desirable.
5.2 Toward Data Correlation
Localizing the cameras is only one aspect of data correlation with dynamic scenes.
Localization gives the position and orientation of the ¯elds of views of the cameras
in the network and a model of how the sensing ¯elds relate which can be used for
further issues in data correlation. For example, localization information helps when
determining motion patterns between cameras from the dynamic scenes. This is an
aspect of data correlation that is used in applications such as tracking and anomoly
detection. By determining how moving objects transition between cameras, a model
or distribution can be built for tra±c patterns in the network.
If two cameras have an overlapping in their ¯elds of view where an object transition71
through, then it is easier to determine a model for object motion between these
cameras. At this point of overlap, where the object is seen by both cameras, the
localization gives and a geometric relation for this object on how it should look in
each camera. The object may have di®erent appearances in each camera's ¯eld of
view, yet due to the geometric constraint at the overlap, it can still be determined
that this is the same object seen by both cameras. For the areas where the cameras do
not overlap, the similarity in appearance of the object within each camera's ¯eld can
be used to track the object and when the object reaches the overlapping region, the
non-overlapping information from each camera can be related to each other through
this overlap.
With our method, we have taken a good ¯rst step toward improving data cor-
relation in camera networks. We have demonstrated a novel technique for doing
localization of cameras in a network using dynamic scene information. We have
demonstrated how this technique work on both simulated and real data and shown
that using moving objects can give a good estimates of the localization parameters,
(R;T), in situations where static features cannot be used. Additionally, we have
discussed the limits of image data and how it can be bolstered by radio data in the
network to recover all extrinsic parameters. We hope that our work will inspire others
to go beyond single frame information and explore how dynamic scene information
can be used.72
Chapter 6
Introduction to Camera Network
Attack Detection
The ultimate security is your understanding of reality.
H. Stanley Judd (1936-)
In recent years, the growth of camera networks has progressed at a rapid pace,
particularly after the events of September 11, 2001. Camera networks have drawn
increasing attention and their use has become more widespread, particularly in public,
uncontrolled spaces. The images from the cameras provide a rich source of information
about the environment and the distributed nature of the sensor network introduces
°exibility in system scaling as well as di®erent perspectives of the same event or
subjects of interest. Yet, the expansion in use of these networks raise security concerns
as more often these cameras are in space where they are open to attacks. While there
are measures to protect image data in transmission and storage, detecting attacks on73
the network to determine if the data being transmitted is trustworthy is still an open
area. In this chapter, we give brief overview of current security measures for camera
networks and the current challenge of detecting attacks on the cameras themselves.
We discuss how taking advantage of the image data can be used for detecting attacks
on the cameras in the network.
6.1 Camera Network Security and the Importance
of Image Data
In any network, it is important to consider security concerns in order to prevent
substantial performance degradation or privacy intrusion. Particularly in camera
networks, with the level of detail that image data provides, security breaches can
have a large impact. For example, in Maryland in 2003, three women were accidently
arrested and charged with murder because of an unsynchronized camera at an ATM.
Their pictures were °ashed in front of a national audience and they spent three weeks
in a Maryland jail before it was discovered that the camera was set to the wrong time
[84]. In 2006, a German museum's security camera on the roof of the building was
moved without authorization to spy on the private Berlin °at of German Chancellor
Angela Merkel [27]. In 2006, an Austrian group called Quintessenz, hacked into police
video feeds in Vienna Austria. The group used an o®-the-shelf 1-GHz satellite receiver
to intercept the video signal transmitted by a surveillance camera overlooking a busy74
square in the Vienna. This enabled them to view everything recorded by the camera,
which was only authorized to be seen by the police[32].
A security breech can occur at any point in the camera network. Methods exist for
detecting and protecting data from security breeches at the base station and while in
transmission. At the base station where image data is stored, access control methods
can be used to allow only authorized entities to view the image data. For example, a
base-station can handshake with a user and make the user prove that it has a correct
cryptographic key or password for viewing the image data. Stanton et al. evaluates
a number of di®erent multimedia storage solutions [82].
During transmission, image data can be protected and security breeches detected
via methods such as encryption, watermarking, and message authentication Codes
(MAC). Data encryption has shown to be e®ective at preventing security breeches
and custom-tailored algorithms have been designed which exploit properties of im-
age/video compression protocols, such as MPEG, and are described by Shi et. al [80]
and Li et. al [44]. Semi-fragile watermarking [67, 70] and image hashing functions
[95, 73] can also be used so the base station can authenticate the image data and
ensure it has not been corrupted. Performing authentication to verify that the data
is coming from a speci¯c camera node, rather than an attacker inserting data can be
accomplished using MACs on the communicated data.
While the transmission and base station portions of the network have security
methods available to them, limited work has been done on methods for detecting75
security breeches at the camera node portion of the network. In particulary, doing
intrusion detection on the camera node end of the network is an open area. Intrusion
detection is de¯ned as detecting a deliberate unauthorized attempt or attack by an
unauthorized entity to access information, manipulate information, or render a system
unrealiable or unusuable [8]. In doing this intrusion detection on the camera in the
network to determine if an attack has happened on the data before it was transmitted,
speci¯c image-based security methods must be considered.
Attacks on the cameras a®ect the image data the camera is going to send through
the network, for example, changing where the ¯eld of view of the camera is pointed is
one type of attack. As these attacks may not a®ect any other function of the network,
the image data must be relied upon to provide the necessary cues to determine if an
attack has occurred. While this could be done manually, by constantly monitoring the
images getting transmitted, often times the data from the network is not monitored
in real-time and there is too much information coming in for a human to detect when
an attack has occurred. Additionally, if the images from the cameras are not actively
monitored, just transmitted and then stored so they can be used at a later date,
manual methods will not work. It is still necessary to know, when this image data
is recalled, if it is faulty or not. Thus, it is important then to have an automatic
detection method, based on image data, for determining whether a camera has been
compromised and if its image data is faulty.76
6.2 Related Work for Attack Detection
In doing intrusion detection on cameras in a network, we propose a method that
uses image features to build a reputation of the cameras to determine if they are
sending faulty data or not. There is a large body of work on reputation systems as they
have proven useful as a self-policing mechanism to address the threat of compromised
entities. The idea has been used in many ¯elds, including, economics, sociology, and
computer science. For the sake of space, we discuss some of the key works where the
reputation systems have been applied, particularly in sensor networks.
Centralized reputations systems were popularized by the internet [24, 76, 68]. An
example of this in practice is Ebay's rating system [76]. Decentralized methods for
use in self-organized networks were discussed for use in [59]. Applications of this
to sensor networks include the CORE reputation system [54] and the CONFIDANT
protocol [13]. These methods use a watchdog module at each node to monitor the
forwarding rate of the neighbors of a node. If the node does not forward the message,
its reputation decreases, and this information is propagated throughout the network.
The watchdog module also uses the second hand information from other nodes to
¯nd the overall reputation of the node. Over time the badly behaving nodes are less
trusted and will not be used in forming reliable paths for routing purposes.
The most relevant work to ours is presented in [28]. The authors suggest a high
level reputation system framework for sensor networks. The main di®erence between
our work and [28] is that the authors only suggest a 'watchdog' mechanism to de-77
termine the reputation of each node. They state that there is no unifying way in
which reputations can be assigned, i.e. the mechanism to assign reputation has to be
context dependent.
While the idea of reputation is very prevalent and proven useful in detecting
attacks, the works dealing with detecting attacks on cameras have not explored the
idea and are more ad-hoc. Works discussing attacks on cameras term the issue as
camera tampering with varying de¯nitions. In [7], tampering is de¯ned as the camera
lens being obscured, for example by a foreign object or spraying paint, or if the camera
has been defocused is discussed. The detect tampering, an intensity description, in
the wavelet domain, of the background of the scene the camera is observing is learned.
Camera tampering is deemed to have occurred if the current frame's intensity varies
over a given threshold from the learned background intensity values. Additionally, the
current frame's intensity must be darker than the background scene as it is assumed
that obscuring the camera forces intensity to decrease.
Alternatively, tampering is de¯ned as any sustained event which dramatically
alters the image seen by the camera in [78]. Here the authors present a method based
on comparing the color histograms of current frames to older frames in di®erent
manners. They compare the gradient of the histogram, the L1 distance between
histograms, and the distance between the two histograms. If all three aspects vary,
it is determined that an attack has occurred.78
6.3 Contributions of Our Approach
With our intrusion detection method, we build upon the previous works, using
both the idea of reputation and the idea of image-based analysis to determine if an
attack has occurred on each camera. However, we combine the two ideas in order to do
intrusion detection on the cameras. Using the idea of reputation, we are able to move
away from ad-hoc image tampering methods and use a statistically founded approach
to intrusion detection. We do not focus on physical attacks to the cameras alone,
but expand our method to deal with more invasive attacks where the image data has
been altered, but the camera has not been moved or obscured. Additionally, we do
not rely on intensity or color data alone, as these aspects are prone to change just
due to a noisy environment and not strictly due to an attack. As cameras are often
monitoring dynamic scenes, it is important our method is robust to this and color
and intensity information does not lend itself to that. We discuss what features from
image data can be used and are more robust to the environments camera networks are
in. We expand the idea of reputation to deal with multi-modal data and how this can
help de¯ne attack signatures. We also develop an automatic assignment mechanism
for reputation for the cameras and do not rely on watchdog modules or context. Our
approach is °exible and can be used in varying setups.
We create an automatic image-based method to detect attacks on cameras in a
network and determine whether they have been compromised is presented. By ana-
lyzing geometric constraints as well as di®ering camera network setups, we determine79
what features from the image data can be used as indications of attacks. As cam-
eras are a rich source of information, there are multiple types of features that can be
pulled from the image data and we explore what features can be used and how to
treat them in a dynamic scene such that they are robust to environmental noise. We
then demonstrate how these features can be used in a reputation scheme in order to
detect attacks on the cameras.80
Chapter 7
Attack Detection Using
Image-Based Reputation
The way to gain a good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to
appear.
Socrates (469 B.C. - 399 B.C.)
To do automatic intrusion detection on the cameras to determine when they have
been attacked and are giving faulty information, we look at varying types of fea-
tures and how they can be used in a spatio-temporal comparison for reputation.
The reputation of each camera will then let the network know whether the camera
is trustworthy, and sending correct information, or whether the camera is untrust-
worthy and sending faulty information. In this chapter, we describe our method of
detecting attacks on cameras using image-based reputation. We present the necessary
assumptions on the network in order to use this method and describe the di®erent81
features that can be used, how they are correlated, and in what camera setups they
can be used in order to determine reputation.
7.1 Problem Formulation
A Camera network consists of some cameras, positioned out in the environment to
be observed, and a base station. There is a supporting communication infrastructure
such that the camera nodes can communicate to the base station and to each other.
The cameras are the nodes of the network which obtain data about the observed
environment and then communicate this to the base station as shown in ¯gure 7.1.
7.1.1 Network Setup
The camera network setup is as follows:
² The cameras are static and at ¯xed locations in the environment
² The camera network's initial setup is done without any tampering by an ad-
versary. Thus, the location, including position and orientation, of cameras,
synchronization, and communication with the base station has been initialized
correctly.
² Once this setup is done, we assume only a trustworthy base station, but make
no other assumptions about the cameras or the communication channel.82
Figure 7.1: Camera Network Setup.
² Cameras capture 10 or more frames per second
We make no assumption on what types of cameras are used, beyond the fact that
they are static, nor what communication method, whether it be IP based wireless
transmission or through coaxial cable. With the above system description, our input
and output are as follows:
² Input: Synchronized image data from the cameras in the network
² Output: Detect if an attack has happened at the camera node end of the
network and which, if any, nodes have been tampered with and are sending83
faulty information.
The network has n cameras with a possibility of one or more cameras being at-
tacked and sending faulty data. There are three di®erent types of camera con¯gura-
tions that can exist in the network as shown in Figure 7.1.1. We focus on these three
di®erent con¯gurations as di®erent combinations of them cover all possible camera
network setups. These arrangements are as follows:
² Single Camera with No Overlap In this arrangement a camera has no
overlap in its ¯elds of view with any other cameras in the network.
² Multiple Overlapping Cameras In this arrangement, there are at least 2 or
more cameras that have an overlap in their ¯eld of views. There can be multiple
groups of camera with overlaps in at least pairwise ¯elds of view.
² Multiple Nonoverlapping Cameras In this setup, at least two cameras have
a correlation in the spatio-temporal domain in the data they see even though
they do not have overlapping ¯elds of view.
7.1.2 Types of Attacks
For intrusion detection on the camera nodes, the attacks we are trying to detect
are active attacks since the adversary e®ects the functioning of the network. An
active attack is one that interferes with the operation of the network in some way84
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.2: Three di®erent camera setups: (a) a single non-overlapping camera (b) two
cameras with overlapping ¯elds of view and (c) two cameras with non-overlapping ¯elds of
view, but correlation on motion between them.
as opposed to a passive attack in which the adversary just listens to or eavesdrops
on network tra±c. Here we look at the following active attacks that happen on the
camera nodes.
Non-invasive
In this type of attack the internal workings of the camera are not tampered with
nor the algorithms running on it. However, external operations, such as the location
of the camera, can be altered. Non-invasive attacks involve the least skill from the
adversary, but can still have an signi¯cant impact on the network operation. These
types of attacks include:
² Moving the Camera: This involves moving a camera to a di®erent location
than where it was originally designated to be when the camera network was
setup . If a speci¯c area is suppose to be monitored by a camera node, moving
this node will change the coverage area a®ecting the purpose of the system. For85
example, if the camera network is use for surveillance, moving a camera may
leave an area unmonitored and create a vulnerability for the attacker to escape
detection by the system. If image data from cameras with overlapping ¯elds of
view is needed in order to do some task, for example 3D reconstruction, moving
a camera will result in the inaccurate results.
² Blocking the Camera: This involves putting an object in front of a camera
to occlude part or all of the ¯eld of view or just covering up the camera lens
completely. For example, people have blinded cameras with balloons, lasers and
infrared devices, and put covers over the camera lenses [32, 37]. These kinds of
attacks, while not necessarily preventable, can at least be detected by computer
vision techniques so appropriate steps can be taken.
² Defocusing the Camera: This involves changing the focus level of the camera
to make the image blurry so that no details can be determined.
The e®ects of non-invasive attacks vary depending on the network design. It can
make an area that the network is originally supposed to be monitoring vulnerable
because there is no longer image data coming from that designated area. It can a®ect
distributed algorithms that depend on the location of the cameras. For example, if
there is camera hando® so that an item being tracked can be followed throughout
the coverage space of the camera network, the hando® will not happen correctly or
no information will come from the attacked camera. When overlapping ¯elds of view86
from multiple cameras are needed to perform certain tasks like 3D reconstruction and
depth calculations, then if one of those cameras is attacked, these calculations cannot
be performed. Thus, it is important to ¯nd ways to detect when these types of events
are occurring and trigger and appropriate response.
Invasive
Invasive attacks involve changing the actual data the camera node is sending by
changing the internal working of the camera node This type of attack requires a
more skillful adversary than a non-invasive attack as it may entail reverse engineering
followed by probing techniques and access to the chip level components of the camera.
As a result, the attacker has an access to the information stored on the chip, and can
cause substantial damage to the system. Invasive attacks include:
² Time-stamping Change:Changing the time-stamping on images from a cam-
era by altering its internal clock is just one example. If the cameras are syn-
chronized, and the attacker is able to change the time stamping of one camera,
then the frames corresponding to the same global time instance will be di®erent
on two neighboring cameras. This can e®ect tasks of the network, for example
tracking of a moving object through a surveillance area. If one camera node
sees the object and sends a signal to a camera node with a compromised clock
to pick up the object at a certain time, this triggering will not work and the
object may not get tracked appropriately. A method for re- synchronizing the
cameras must be developed in order to alleviate this type of attack. This can87
be done using a signal sent out from the base station or if that is not possible,
synchronize across nearby cameras using a common feature shared in time.
² Injecting Faulty Data: This type of attack involves using the camera to
send faulty data that the attacker injects into the system and which the camera
node would never have obtained. This includes replay attacks. A replay attack
involves an adversary delaying a feed from a camera node or putting it in a play
back loop of some sequence of images that the camera previously captured. The
images being fed back to the base station will not actually correspond to what is
going on in the environment at the current time. However, the time-stamping is
correct and the images were taken by the actual camera at that location, just at
a di®erent time. Thus, it will be hard to detect this attack as they images may
look correct and the time-stamping and authentication codes will be correct.
Both non-invasive and invasive attacks can be hard to detect even if images from
the camera network are being actively monitored at the base station by authorized
entities. It is di±cult for humans to take in and process in real time the amount of
visual information that can be coming in from multiple cameras . Cues that a camera
node is being tampered with can be missed as the cue may only take up a few frames
or the di®erences may not be immediately apparent to the human eye. Thus, an
automatic method is needed that can more easily and quickly detect these attacks on
the camera nodes, yet still be robust to the dynamic environment which the cameras
are observing and noisy data. This is what our method based on reputation systems88
provides.
Our reputation method will provide noti¯cation of when a camera node is being
attacked while still being robust to the environmental conditions and noisy data. If a
camera network is being actively monitored at the base-station, then an appropriate
entity can respond to the noti¯cation of tampering. However, if the network is not
being actively monitored, then the noti¯cation can be used to mark data coming from
that camera as faulty so that if the data recorded by the network is needed at a later
date, faulty data will not be used.
7.2 Beta-Reputation Expanded
For a camera network, we want to determine which camera nodes are are untrust-
worthy. In order to do this, we look at feature observations from the image data of
the cameras and assign a reputation based on how consisted these features are. For
a given camera, we assign reputation based on the consistency of features with 1)
previous features from the same camera and/or 2) features from other cameras which
have a relation to the given camera.
To assign a reputation to a camera, we use the Beta distribution based reputation
[35]. When dealing with binary event outcomes the posterior probability of binary
events can be represented as a Beta distribution. Since observations of an image
feature can be thought of as a binary event, the Beta distribution is well suited for
our purposes. De¯ne a binary even with an outcome of either y or ¹ y. The Beta89
probability density function then takes the integer number of past observations of
y and ¹ y, which we de¯ne as s and ¹ s respectively, to predict relative frequency with
which y will happen in the future. The Beta distribution is the conjugate prior of
the binomial distribution and the expected value of the Beta distribution then gives
us an the expected relative frequency with which y will happen in the future as show
below:
E(p) = ®=(® + ¯) (7.1)
where
® = s + 1 > 0
¯ = ¹ s + 1 > 0
0 · p · 1
(7.2)
and p is a probability variable representing the probability of an event, in this case
of y, occuring.
Mapping this now to the reputation of cameras, we can treat the appearance
of a feature at a given time instance as a binary event. At any time instance, a
feature is either seen or not seen and thus, we can treat the degree of trustworthi-
ness/untrustworthiness as a based on the number of binary outcomes of each feature
observation. The pair of variable (s; ¹ s) is a continuous pair of values that now re-90
lates the degree of trustworthiness, s, and untrustworthiness, ¹ s, based on the binary
feature observations. The posterior probability of this type of continuous variables
is most accurately represented by the Beta distribution and has been shown mathe-
matically in [35]. In Bayesian statistics, the Beta distribution can then be seen as the
posterior distribution of parameter p of a binomial distribution after observing ®¡1
independent events with probability p and ¯ ¡1 with probability 1¡p. This type of
reputation scheme is bene¯cial because it is simple, °exible, and relies on statistical
theory instead of ad-hoc rules as previous methods in other areas have done before.
In order to determine the overall reputation of a camera using the Beta distribution
estimate, there are three main steps:
² Instantaneous Rating: At each time instance, positive and negative ratings
are assigned to a camera node based on the outcome of binary feature observa-
tions.
² Aggregation: The instantaneous positive and negative ratings are aggregated
over time for robustness.
² Reputation Assignment: The aggregated positive and negative ratings are
combined using the expected value of the Beta distribution to determine the
overall reputation of the camera node, i.e. how trustworthy/untrustworthy it
is.
For a given time instance t, a camera node receives instantaneous positive and91
negative ratings based on features observations as follows:
st =
jVtj
jFj 2 [0;1]
¹ st =
jUtj
jFj 2 [0;1]
(7.3)
where
(s + ¹ s) 2 [0;1]
jFtj = total number of features that should appear at t
jVtj = number of features observed at time t
jUtj = number of features not observed at time t
It is important to note that Ut + Vt · Ft. We will go into detail on how Ut and Vt
are calculated in the next section. The pair, (st; ¹ st), gives an instantaneous snapshot
of the trustworthiness/untrustworthiness of the camera by using only the features
observations from the current time instance and looking at features observations that
positively correlate as expected along with feature observations which deviate from
what is expected.
We want to incorporate the instantaneous ratings with ratings from previous time
instances in order to make the system more robust to noise. However, we want the
current time instance to have more in°uence on the ratings. To do this, we aggregate
ratings over time with a weighting variable as follows:92
sa
t = ¸sa
t¡1 + st
¹ sa
t = ¸¹ sa
t¡1 + ¹ st (7.4)
where sa
t and ¹ sa
t are the aggregated positive and negative ratings respectively and ¸ is
a weighting factor which determines how much ratings from previous time instances
will in°uence the aggregated rating. This gives the aggregated positive and negative
ratings for the camera which look over a longer period of time, making the measure
more robust to noise.
A single reputation for the camera is then assigned based on a combination of the
aggregated positive and negative ratings. This reputation determines how trustworthy
the data from the camera is and how likely it is that the camera has been attacked.
The reputation is assigned on a scale of [0;1], where 0 is fully untrustworthy and 1
is fully trustworthy. We use the expected value of the Beta distribution to determine
overall reputation as follows:
r
t =
sa
t + 1
sa
t + ¹ sa
t + 2
(7.5)
The Beta distribution is well suited to our problem and gives a statistical backing to
the reputation assignment, while allowing it to still be robust and °exible.
Once the overall reputation of the camera node falls too low, the camera node is93
deemed untrustworthy. Appropriate steps can then be taken. Depending on what
the application of the system is and which algorithms are running, these steps could
be as simple as notifying an appropriate entity that the camera is untrustworthy and
it might need to be checked out or more complicated, as appropriately weighting
measurements from the cameras in automatic calculations such as 3D reconstruction
or tracking estimates.
7.3 Camera Methods
In the previous section we discussed generally how the reputation is assigned to
a camera node based on features. In this section, we will go into details about the
di®erent types of features to use and how to relate the observations, i.e. space-time
correlations, given the three di®ering types of camera con¯gurations in the network.
The three steps we cover for each type of feature are:
1. Feature Detection:What the desired features are, what they represent in the
scene, and how to detect them in an image.
2. Feature Correlation: How to correlate the features and what camera setup
is needed. The correlation can be an intra-camera step, where the features in
one frame of a camera are compared against features from previous frames of
that same camera, or it can be an inter-camera step or where features from one
camera are compared against features from another camera.94
3. Instantaneous Rating:How the features observations and correlations are
used to assign the instantaneous trustworthy and untrustworthy ratings to each
camera. From this, overall reputation follows as described in the previous sec-
tion.
In this section we also focus on the ¯rst step in the reputation assignment, the
instantaneous ratings assignment of equation 7.3. This is the step directly a®ected
by use of di®erent feature observations. Once the ratings are assigned, the reputation
follows directly from equations 7.4 and 7.5.
We discuss what type of attack each feature can be used to detect in the reputation
system and the limits in the number of compromised nodes that can be detected.
7.3.1 Static Features
Static features are features that are permanent in the scene and we expect to see
there consistently over time. In order to use static features for reputation assignment,
¯rst a set of robust static scene features, F, must be initially chosen. These features
can be learned automatically using methods from the computer vision community,
such as [55, 14, 90, 86, 45] to detect local features in a camera's ¯eld of view. The
features can also be chosen manually by picking out landmarks in the scene, such as
buildings or areas of interest, and building a detector/descriptor of each these.
Once the set of robust features, F, is determined, at each time instance, t, the
feature detector is run to see whether these features exist in the image and at what95
location. At each time instance, we obtain:
Ot µ F = subset features of F observed at time
¹ Ot µ F = subset of features of F not observed
(7.6)
When looking at equation 7.3, the naive approach would be to make Vt = Ot and
Ut = ¹ Ot. However, since the camera is observing a dynamic environment, it could
be that a feature is counted in ¹ Ot due to an object in the foreground occluding it,
not because the feature is not actually still present in the scene. This is shown in
Figure ??. Conversely, we do not want to credit the camera if a feature appears on a
foreground object and not in the scene as we are unsure if that feature is actually still
present in the scene. It is important that we only credit or discredit the reputation of
the camera when features we expect to see are respectively either in the scene or no
longer present in the scene. We want the minimize the e®ect of environmental noise,
due to the scene dynamics, on the reputation of the camera.
To make our reputation robust to this environmental noise, we take occlusions
into account and divide the image into foreground and background. The parameter
Vt and Ut are then as follows:
Vt µ Ot = features of F observed in background
Ut µ ¹ Ot = features of F not observed in background
(7.7)
We do not look for features in areas considered as foreground in the image to make the96
instantaneous ratings more robust as the feature might still be present, but occluded
or not present, but appearing on foreground objects. While the ¯rst of these will occur
more often, it is important to consider both situations as they will incorrectly in°uence
the reputation of the camera if not addressed. Using the only the background for the
reputation makes the result more robust to noise and the dynamic environment. This
gives a more accurate description of which cameras are actually untrustworthy and
have been attacked as opposed to just picking up on environmental noise.
We have explained the static feature method given a single camera, but it can
be easily generalized to the multiple cameras with overlapping ¯elds of view setup.
With the overlapping cameras F now becomes a common set of static features both
cameras see and the reputation is now a pairwise reputation. Given two camera Ci
and Cj then the static features are Fij and the pairwise reputation is judged by each
camera, Rij and Rji. To determine a single camera's reputation, then the following
is done:
Ri = mean(
P
j Rij) wherei 6= jfor j 2 1;:::;n
Rj = mean(
P
i Rji) wherej 6= ifor i 2 1;:::;n
(7.8)
The multiple camera case does not give any more information than doing the single
camera case, thus for static features, we stick to single cameras.
For the single camera case, the reputation assignment based on static features
must be done centrally, by the base station or another trusted entity since only the97
single camera can report on its data for its reputation. If the reputation is assigned
on the camera's end of the network and then reported back to the base station, a
compromised camera could always report itself with a trustworthy reputation even
if it is compromised. Instead, having the base station either analyze the images the
camera is sending back or the consistency of the feature observations the camera is
sending, and then applying the reputation scheme to this information, is more robust
to attacks. A much more savvy adversary is needed in order to trick the reputation
scheme for a single camera if reputation is done at the base station. The adversary
would have to accurately imitate observations of the static features that the base
station has chosen or, they would have to put the camera in a feedback loop.
Using the reputation system on static features within a single camera, it can be
determined if an non-invasive attack has happened. However, an invasive attack, such
as replay loops or synchronization changes, will not be detected. An invasive attack
where faulty data is injection, but is not a replay loop, can be detected if the observed
features in the faulty data vary enough from what is expected in F.
7.3.2 Overlapping Motion Features
In addition to static features, overlapping motion features can also be used. We
de¯ne overlapping motion features as motion of dynamic objects moving through the
scene viewed by two or more cameras at any time. Thus, the overlapping motion
features can only be used with cameras which have overlapping ¯elds of view. In98
addition, to use this method there are two assumptions that must be present in
the system. First, the cameras must be synchronized within some error, and time-
stamps should be given on the images. Second, the cameras are calibrated to a world
coordinate frame.
Given some set of cameras C1;:::;Cn, moving objects are segmented out of the
images using background subtraction. This leave us with a set of foreground objects,
Oi, for each camera Ci. We represent the objects by a point. The point that is chosen
can vary depending on how much knowledge there is of the camera setup relative to
the scene. If there is a known ground plane in the scene or known scene con¯guration,
we can choose either the point on the object that should lie on the ground plane, for
example point where the feet touch the ground for a human. Otherwise, the centroid
of the object can be used as the point. Depending on what type of point is chosen
will just e®ect how much error needs to be allowed in the measurements when doing
correlation. For each adjacent time period of, t0 ¡ tn, the points on the objects are
tracked and then correlated. The tracking can be done using any sort of multi-target
data association algorithm. This leaves us with object image tracks to use as features
for doing correlation.
For each pair of overlapping cameras, Ci and Cj we then have:
Ti = the tracks in time t0 ¡ tn in cameraCi
Tj = the tracks in time t0 ¡ tn in cameraCj
(7.9)99
Since Ci and Cj are di®erent cameras, they do not have complete overlap in their
¯elds of view, thus Ti might not be equal to Tj as motion could be happening in
the non-overlapping portion of the cameras. If there is a known ground plane in the
scene that the cameras are oriented to, then the location on that ground plane of the
object can determine if the object is in the overlapping portion of the cameras. If
there is no common ground plane, we can use a more general approach and just take
the maximum number of tracks between the two cameras as the number of motions
that should match up:
jFj = max(jTij;jTjj) (7.10)
Without loss of generality, assume jTij ¸ jTjj, then each track in Ti is mapped to
the best single track in Tj. For a given point, xi 2 Ti, and the corresponding point
xj 2 Tj, then the reprojection error is:
d
2
j + d
2
i =
(xT
j ^ TRxi)2
jj^ e3 ^ TRxijj
+
(xT
i ^ TRxj)2
jj^ e3 ^ TRxjjj
where e3 = [0;0;0;1]T 2 R3 and R and T are the rotation and translation of the
one camera coordinate system into the other. This gives us a measurement on how
correlated the two points are. For more details reprojection error please refer [77, 96]
The mean reprojection error then between tracks is then used as the measure100
of how well those two tracks correlate. We choose the correlations which have the
smallest mean reprojection error within some bounds. If the mean reprojection error
falls outside this bound, we say the tracks do not match up. Thus, we are left with:
Tm = number of tracks pairings within the error bound
T ¹ m = number of track pairings that don't match
(7.11)
the:
Vt = Tm
Ut = T ¹ m
(7.12)
and the instantaneous rating can be assigned, but it is a pairwise instantaneous rating
Rij. Thus, there is an additional step that must be taken to ¯nd the reputation of
each camera:
Ri = mean(
X
j
Rij) wherei 6= j (7.13)
This method using overlapping motion can be done one of two ways. It can be
completely carried out at the base station by either the cameras relying their images
or motion features. Or the pairwise reputations can be done in a distributed fashion,
with each camera keeping track of pairwise reputations for those cameras which it101
has overlap with. These distributed pairwise reputations can be fed back to the base
station and the summation from equation 7.13 can be carried out.
Using overlapping motion features, invasive attacks can be detected, such as replay
loops, where the static feature would still match up, but the motion features would
not be likely to match up. Thus, the use of overlapping motion features is
7.3.3 Non-overlapping Motion Features
Similar to overlapping motion features, non-overlapping motion features depends
on dynamic objects in the scene. However, here we assume there is no overlap in the
motion, i.e., the dynamic objects are not seen at the same time by the same cameras.
Yet, there is some correlation in one they leave the ¯eld of view of one camera and
enter the ¯eld of view of another camera. This happens when cameras do not have
any overlap in their ¯elds of view or even for cameras that have some overlap, but
for the areas where this overlap is no longer present.
If there is some correlation of motion between cameras, a distribution on when
moving objects exit the ¯eld of view of one camera and enter the ¯eld of view of
another can be found as shown in where it was used for tracking. We expand upon
this idea to not only use time of departure and arrival between ¯elds of view, but
also optical °ow of the object, as delta between the time of departure and arrival will
have some correlation with °ow. The distribution that applies to the non-overlapping
motion can be learned by collecting the state information and then building a distri-102
bution in the necessary manner.
Once this distribution is known, then given two camera, Ci and Cj with a dis-
tribution Pij on the motion between their ¯elds of view, we can use this to build
a pairwise reputation. Given a moving object in the scene with state x = k, then
the we can determine what what Pij(x = k) is. If there are N objects in the scene,
and n 2 N have states lying in P and ¹ n do not lie in the distribution P, then the
reputation is assigned as follows:
Vt = n
N
Ut =
j¹ nj
N
(7.14)
then the pairwise reputation are used to determine each camera's reputation as in
7.13
By modeling the motion into the feature observations, we can use the correspon-
dence for between what is observed and what our model is, to base the reputation on.
For example, if we have a model of the exit time of objects from one camera's ¯eld
of view to the entrance time into the other camera's ¯eld of view, then we can use
this to compare against when we notice moving objects in the scene. In they build a
model of how the motion correlates... in our paper we use this kind of an idea, but
extend the model to include optical °ow and build the reputation around this.
This method allows us to detect invasive attacks even when the cameras have no
overlap in their ¯elds of view. Thus, this allows a broader array of con¯gurations for103
our camera network setup while still having security measures.
7.4 Experiments
We demonstrate the image-based reputation method using the di®erent features
on varying setups.
7.5 Static Features
Our ¯rst camera network consists of four cameras which have no overlap and
no correlation in motion between them. Since these cameras have no overlap, we
performed attacks on one of the cameras and looked at how static features are used
to form reputation.
The frame rate on this experiment was approximately 1 frame per second. Since
there is no overlap, the image-based reputation can be formed on only static features
within each camera's ¯eld of view. In order to obtain the set of static features F,
we took image data from 10 minutes of video and ran a Harris corner static feature
detector to learn what a robust set of static features is for F. To detect foreground
objects we use a version of the background subtraction method of [100]which is based
on Gaussian Mixture Models on pixel values. A value of 0:7 is used for ¸ in this
experiment.
Here we ran three di®erent types of attacks. First, we ran an attack where a104
camera's ¯eld of view is obscured by something covering it. For this attack, we
covered the ¯eld of view with a plastic bag we tied into a balloon and °oated in front
of the camera. Images from this attack can be seen in 7.3. The reputation results are
shown in 7.4.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 7.3: Lens Covering and static features: Images from the attack where this camera's
lens is obscured by a bag. (Top Row) Sub¯gures (a) and (b) shows the ¯eld of view of the
camera before it is obscured by the bag in sub¯gures (c) and (d). (Bottom Row) Sub¯gures
(e) and (f) show that all the features from the static feature set are detected before the
attack and (g) and (h) show the static features in red that should be detected and the actual
features that are detected in green which do not correspond to the static feature set.
Second, we ran an attack where one of the cameras is physically moved.
Third, we ran an attack where the lense of the camera is blinded by a laser. We
used a laser pointer and aimed it at the ccd of the camera to blind the lense. The
images from this attack are shown in 7.5. The reputation from this attack is shown105
Figure 7.4: Lens Covering of a Single Camera:The graph shows the di®erence between
using instantaneous percentages of features seen, an average of the number of features points
seen, and using a reputation based on static features. The lens of the camera is covered by
a bag at frame 75. The instantaneous percentages are very sensitive to occluding objects
hiding features while the average is not sensitive enough to changes in the scene as it takes
a while to fall o® after the lens has been covered. The reputation system provides a good
balance of sensitivity and reactivity.
in 7.8.
As can be the image-based reputation method does detect these attacks and is only
triggered by these attacks, not by the noise in the environment. We show the results
from only one camera to eliminate redundancy as each camera is treated individually
for static features. We compare this against the results if just the instantaneous
percentage of visible features is used for the reputation and against the average,over106
Figure 7.5: Moving a Camera Attack. (Top Row) Original views from the ¯elds of view of
the cameras. (Bottom Row) Views from the cameras with the third camera being moved.
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Figure 7.6: Moving of a Single Camera:The graph shows the di®erence between the
reputation, based on static features, of the cameras that are not moved and the camera
that is moved. Camera 4 if moved at frame 42 so that it's ¯eld of view points in a di®erent
direction.107
Figure 7.7: Blinding Camera with Laser Attack. (Top Row) shows images from the
attack. (Bottom Row) Shows the static features. The red features are the set of robust
static features. The green features are the sets of detected features for that image. In the
¯rst two images in this row, the robust static features overlap with the detected features,
thus no green features appear. In the left two images, the detected features do not overlap
with the robust static features.108
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Figure 7.8: Lens Blinding of a Single Camera:The graph shows the di®erence between
using instantaneous percentages of features seen, an average of the number of features points
seen, and using a reputation based on static features. The lens of the camera is blinded by
a laser at frame 84 and after. The instantaneous percentages are very sensitive to occluding
objects hiding features while the average is not sensitive enough to changes in the scene as
it takes a while to fall o® after the lens has been blinded. The reputation system provides
a good balance of sensitivity and reactivity.
frames, of visible features as the reputation. It is shown that the instantaneous
percentage is very sensitive to features getting occluded. In frame 50 many features
are occluded, due to environmental noise, and this causes the percentage of visible
features to dip very low. If the owner of the camera system was to be noti¯ed whenever
a camera's reputation got too low, as a signal of an attack, this method of reputation
would cause many false alarms. The use of average percentages across frames is not
as bene¯cial as our propose reputation system as it takes a long time to decay once
the camera is covered by the bag. Thus, the owner of the camera network would not109
be noti¯ed later in the process than when our reputation system would notify that the
camera reputation is too low. The noise of the environment does not cause a camera's
reputation to become untrustworthy, as the intantaneous feature rating causes and
the reputation responds more immediately to the attack than another approach just
taking average number of features. Thus, we show that the method is robust to noise,
but sensitive to the attacks.
7.5.1 Overlapping Cameras and Overlapping Motion Fea-
tures
We also tested the reputation system on a multi-camera setup that where the
four cameras all overlapped in a portion of their ¯elds of view with one another.
The four cameras placed around a 20 x 30 room for this experiment. The cameras
were synchronized to a global clock, so images from all cameras were taken at the
same time instance. Images of objects moving through the scene were taken. We
spliced together parts of two sequences, de¯ned as sequence 1 and sequence 2, from
camera 1 and used this to imitate an attack where the adversary sets the camera in
a playback loop. We compared this against the complete sequence 1 from the rest
of the cameras. The sequence is 99 frames long, with the playback loop inserted at
frame 51. The scene consists of an empty area with a person walking through it at
frame 43 till frame 99. The results are shown in Figure 7.12. It can be seen that the
reputation based on comparing features seen in the frames of camera 1 does not look110
signi¯cantly di®erent than the reputations of the other cameras based on this same
measure. However, the reputations using foreground object correspondences between
multiple cameras shows that an attack is happening. By looking at the reputation on
each pair of cameras, it can be seen that the reputation on any pair involving camera
1 below the acceptable threshold for a good camera pair. By looking at the overlap
of the cameras pairs that fall below the acceptable threshold, it can be determined
that camera 1 is the camera that has been attacked.
If we use the static feature reputation along with the reputation on pairs of cameras
due to foreground objects, it can be determined that a playback attack is likely the
cause. In order for the static reputation to remain good while the pairwise reputations
involving that camera fall below the acceptable threshold, the camera would have to
be observing the same background seen, yet seeing di®erent motions of the foreground
objects in the scene. While this could possibly be caused by another attack, for
instance the camera getting moved to an area where the same type of features will
appear in the image at the same locations, yet the object motion would di®er, this
is highly unlikely. It would by very di±cult to ¯nd a way to place the camera in a
di®erent area yet have the background features remain exactly in the same place. It
is more probable that the camera was put in a playback loop as an attack on the
network, just replaying previous frames captured from the camera over again. This
would cause images from the camera to still show the same feature points from the
seen, yet show di®erent motions of the foreground objects.111
Figure 7.9: Original views from the cameras with a moving object in the scene
Figure 7.10: Sequence of moving object in a pair of cameras112
Figure 7.11: Replay Attack. (Top Row) The camera where the replay attack happens.
The second two frames show the views when the replay attack is occuring. (Bottom Row)
Another camera in the network that is trustworthy and has not been attacked. As can be
seen, the two cameras should both not see any moving objects if they are trustworthy, but
the top camera shows moving objects due to the replay attack.113
7.5.2 Non-Overlapping Cameras and Non-Overlapping Mo-
tion Features
Each camera network used Panasonic KX-HCM280A IP cameras and we used
their network capabilities to obtain data. These are commercial cameras and of a
quality that is becoming more common in surveillance camera network settings. The
cameras have remote 350 degree pan and 220 degree tilt and a 21x optical zoom. Our
cameras were synchronized with one another and each frame was time stamped.
On our third setup we looked at two non-overlapping cameras which had a corre-
lation of motion between when moving objects exited the ¯eld of view of one camera
and entered the ¯eld of view of the second camera. In this camera network, Panasonic
KX-HCM280A IP cameras and were used to obtain data. These are commercial cam-
eras and of a quality that is becoming more common in surveillance camera network
settings. The cameras have remote 350 degree pan and 220 degree tilt and a 21x
optical zoom. Our cameras were synchronized with one another and each frame was
time stamped with a rate of 5-12 frames per second over the network.
For this setup, we took twenty training sequences between a camera pair we de¯ne
as (Ci;Cj) and manually determined the entrance/exit points of objects between the
cameras. We then created a histogram of the transition times of objects between
exit from one ¯eld of view, either Ci or Cj, to entrance in to the next ¯eld of view,
respectively Cj or Ci. We ¯tted a gaussian distribution to this histogram to use as
our model of transition times between the cameras, as shown in Figure 7.5.2, and set114
a good transition to be any transition time, k, such that P(x = k) > 0:1. For the
replay attack, we took an earlier sequence captured from camera Ci and replayed this
in a loop starting at frame 100 while camera Cj was showing the true data it was
capturing. The resulting reputation for the camera pair is shown in Figure 7.5.2.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented an image-based reputation system that can be
used for detecting attacks on the camera nodes themselves. We have shown how
varying features from images can be used to detect di®erent types of active attacks
and have shown their tradeo®s. While the use of static features is more robust
in detecting certain types of attacks, as the reputation can be calculated o® these
features at every time instance, the reputation on these features can only be used
to detect non-invasive attacks. On the other hand, the use of dynamic features to
detect attacks can be used to detect invasive attacks, but will is not as robust as
static features as the reputation is dependent on moving objects in the scene being
present and correlation between these object.
This method of detecting attacks on the cameras in the network provides addi-
tionally security for the network that compliments previous methods for protecting
data in transmission and storage. By presenting this method to detect attacks on the
cameras before their information is transmitted, we have provided a way to check on
the data integrity of the cameras and help further the security of the camera network.115
(a)
(b)
Figure 7.12: Replay Attack: These graphs show the reputations of the cameras during a
playback loop for the replay attack which begins at frame 50 in camera 1. the graph shown
in (a) shows the static feature reputation for each camera while the graph in (b) shows the
pairwise reputations. Only the pairwise reputations show any sign of attack while the static
reputations for all the cameras look similar.116
Figure 7.13: Nonoverlapping Cameras
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Figure 7.14: Replay Attack on Non-Overlapping Cameras. (Left) The model of the
transition time distribution. The bar graph are the results from the training sequences and
the gaussian curve is ¯tted to this data. (Right) The pairwise reputation Rij for when the
given replay attack happens on camera Ci.117
Chapter 8
Introduction to Privacy and
Camera Networks
Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage's whole
existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process
of setting man free from men.
Ayn Rand (1905 - 1982), The Fountainhead (1943)
In the past decade, particularly since the events of September 11, 2001, the place-
ment of camera networks in public spaces has increased both in the U.S. and interna-
tionally. For example, closed circuit televisions systems (CCTV) have grown in recent
years in Britain, with over 4 million cameras surveying the public [50]. In major U.S.
cities, such as Chicago and New York, camera networks are quickly gaining ground
with hundreds of cameras owned and operated by public agencies and thousands more
by private enterprises [9, 62, 4, 58]. Current applications for these networks include
crime detection and tra±c monitoring [36, 49, 88, 19].118
The use of these camera networks in public spaces has demonstrated bene¯ts.
For example, the footage from the London tube stations were used to help identify
the attackers from the 2005 bombings [85, 69]. However, camera networks in public
spaces also raise the issue of privacy for the individuals being monitored.
The importance of considering the privacy issues with cameras in public spaces is
necessary in order to gain the bene¯ts of the technology while limiting the harm to
individuals and maintaining the values of society. Policy-makers in many places, such
as Britain [33], Canada [63], and Sydney, Australia[1, 15] have already attempted to
address privacy issues by making guidelines as to where the camera network will be
placed, requiring notices of recording, and identifying who has the right to see the
image data. Additionally, policy researchers have looked at these issues of surveillance
and privacy stressing the importance of protecting privacy rather than assuming a
de facto trade o® of public privacy in the name of increased security [89, 31, 23]. For
example, the U.S. Constitution Project Guidelines for public surveillance systems
state that \A [Public Visual Surveillance] system should be designed and operated so
that the privacy intrusion it creates is no greater than absolutely necessary to achieve
the systems goals" [89].
Despite the policy guidelines and the discussion generated by policy-makers, few
actions have been undertaken to determine public perceptions of surveillance systems
and what their privacy expectations are with regard to surveillance systems. This
sort of analysis is necessary so that these camera networks can in fact be designed119
and operated with as little intrusion as possible to an observed individual's privacy.
The level of detail camera images capture is the obvious concern, but the need to
understand public perceptions of surveillance systems with regard to privacy becomes
particularly poignant when we recognize concerns beyond this. The remote or hidden
nature of the cameras in public spaces and the inability in some cases for the camera
networks to be avoided by the public, and the ease in which image data can be
transferred without accountability for following privacy protection guidelines. These
are some of the aspects which point towards the need to understand public privacy
concerns with regard to camera networks.
To address this need, we conducted a study to explore visual privacy. We de¯ne
visual privacy as being the relationship between the collection and dissemination
of visual information and the public expectations of the collection and use of this
visual information. We see visual privacy as a subset of the much broader topic of
information privacy. In this paper we look at the visual privacy expectations a group
of individuals being observed by camera network have. We explore these expectations
in order to understand how they can inform the design of the surveillance systems
to better preserve public privacy. Meeting the visual privacy needs of these observed
individuals poses a interesting problem, namely, what happens when participants do
not have control over the technology, but must interact within the space? These
participants are not users in the sense that they directly interact with the technology,
but they are still stakeholders in the system as information about them is getting120
used. What are these participants' expectations, and how can a system be designed
to incorporate these expectations when the participants do not directly interact with
the technology?
8.1 Related Work for Visual Privacy
In examining visual privacy, there have been a number of works that propose
privacy protection by obscuring an observed individual in di®erent ways. A group
of techniques have focused on obscuring the face of observed individuals. In an
approach by Kitahara and Newton the de-identi¯cation of faces is done using previous
knowledge of the person to anonymize the face [39, 61]. Another technique to de-
identify faces utilizes a combination of RFID and image processing [92]. Yet another
approach is presented in [79]which uses visual markers that observed individuals wear
and then use image processing in real-time to obscure faces.
Some techniques have focused on hiding the whole human by just showing a solid
silhouette. An example of this is shown in IBM's People Vision system, where people
that are moving and in the foreground are obscured using robust foreground/background
detection and human silhouette models [97, 17]. This type of approach shows no de-
tail of the moving observed individuals, but does show large scale motion such as
walking (gait) or jumping. Similar to this, methods of blurring the whole image hide
¯ne details of the observed individuals in the scene, but still show large detail and
show large motion as well. An example of this sort of approach is done by 3VR [6].121
While these di®ering approaches for de-identifying faces and humans have been
proposed, these works do not examine what visual privacy actually means for observed
individuals and whether it is actually being preserved by these approaches. Some
research addressing this gap between observed individuals' expectations and ¯ltering
measures includes a study looking at blur ¯ltration in home-based video conferencing
systems [60]. This study states that only bluring at certain levels is actually deemed
privacy protective by subjects and that the level necessary is dependent on the activity
taking place. Additionally, a study looking at a group of women and their views on
visual privacy in relation to who is watching the video is presented in [40]. In this
study, di®erent types of abstraction methods are applied to a single image and the
image is then shown to the subjects. The women are then asked to rank how they
feel about privacy given their relation, on sliding scale of familiar to unfamiliar, to
the people possibly viewing these images.
Our study is is similar to these last two e®orts in that we examine visual privacy
from the observed individual's perspective and are interested in the interplay between
expectations and technical measures. However, our focus is on surveillance in public
spaces and the observed individuals' expectations in this space. Unlike video confer-
encing settings, with public video surveillance the observed individual has no direct
interaction with the technology, yet remains a stakeholder.
In addition, we expand upon the other works by actually placing our subjects
under surveillance. Thus, when reporting how they feel about privacy, subjects had122
actual footage of themselves to judge. This brought the concept of visual privacy into
the personal realm. The subjects were also shown video of themselves, not just still
frames, so they received and reacted to both the spatial and temporal information
video conveys.
Another di®erence with our work is that we examine multiple aspects and their
e®ects on visual privacy expectations. Speci¯cally, we look three di®erent aspects: 1)
activities being performed 2) place where the surveillance is and 3) identifying factors
of race, gender, and face.
Lastly, our study looks at ¯ltering measures and how they might be used as
embedded technology to meet observed individuals' privacy expectations. We present
four di®erent ¯ltering measures, that are possible using only visual data and no prior
knowledge of the observed individuals, and examine if they uphold visual privacy
expectations. We take cues from proposed privacy protection techniques in the related
works and test these types of obscuring ideas in addition to some others, which are
further discussed in the Study Design section.
8.2 Contributions of Our Work
Our study is is similar to these last two e®orts in that we examine visual privacy
from the observed individual's perspective and are interested in the interplay between
expectations and technical measures. However, our focus is on surveillance in public
spaces and the observed individuals' expectations in this space. Unlike video confer-123
encing settings, with public video surveillance the observed individual has no direct
interaction with the technology, yet remains a stakeholder.
In addition, we expand upon the other works by actually placing our subjects
under surveillance. Thus, when reporting how they feel about privacy, subjects had
actual footage of themselves to judge. This brought the concept of visual privacy into
the personal realm. The subjects were also shown video of themselves, not just still
frames, so they received and reacted to both the spatial and temporal information
video conveys.
Another di®erence with our work is that we examine multiple aspects and their
e®ects on visual privacy expectations. Speci¯cally, we look three di®erent aspects: 1)
activities being performed 2) place where the surveillance is and 3) identifying factors
of race, gender, and face.
Lastly, our study looks at ¯ltering measures and how they might be used as
embedded technology to meet observed individuals' privacy expectations. We present
four di®erent ¯ltering measures, that are possible using only visual data and no prior
knowledge of the observed individuals, and examine if they uphold visual privacy
expectations. We take cues from proposed privacy protection techniques in the related
works and test these types of obscuring ideas in addition to some others, which are
further discussed in the Study Design section.
To address this need, we conducted a study to explore visual privacy. We de¯ne
visual privacy as being the relationship between the collection and dissemination124
of visual information and the public expectations of the collection and use of this
visual information. We see visual privacy as a subset of the much broader topic of
information privacy. In this paper we look at the visual privacy expectations a group
of individuals being observed by camera network have. We explore these expectations
in order to understand how they can inform the design of the surveillance systems
to better preserve public privacy. Meeting the visual privacy needs of these observed
individuals poses a interesting problem, namely, what happens when participants do
not have control over the technology, but must interact within the space? These
participants are not users in the sense that they directly interact with the technology,
but they are still stakeholders in the system as information about them is getting
used. What are these participants' expectations, and how can a system be designed
to incorporate these expectations when the participants do not directly interact with
the technology?
In our study we actively surveil our subjects using a network of cameras and
ask them about their response to visual privacy. With this study, we focus on two
main issues. First, we look at privacy expectations in public spaces by analyzing our
subjects' attitudes towards visual privacy in relation to three aspects: 1) activities
being performed 2) place where the surveillance is and 3) identifying factors of race,
gender, and face. Second, we look at how embedded design measures might be able
to meet their expectations since they can not directly interact with the surveillance
technology. We presented four di®erent image-based ¯ltering measures and analyzed125
the subjects' responses to these measures in regards to privacy preservation.126
Chapter 9
Subject Study on Privacy
Expectations in Public Places
The quality of expectations determines the quality of our action.
Andr¶ e Godin (1817-1888)
9.1 Study Design
For this study, subjects participated individually in two di®erent sessions. In the
¯rst session, subjects ¯lled out a short survey and then were asked to walk a given
route on a map and perform a set list of activities. During this walk, the subjects
were unknowingly under surveillance in three di®erent places and footage of them
was recorded. When the subjects returned from their walk, they were asked to ¯ll
out a survey regarding di®erent aspects of being out in public and questions about127
surveillance.
The same subjects returned for the second session 3-7 days later. Ifn this session
they were shown the videos that were recorded of them on their walk from the ¯rst
session. The subjects were shown two types of videos: 1) the three original videos
recorded of them while on their walk and 2) the three same videos with four di®erent
visual ¯ltering methods applied. The subjects also completed another survey during
this session regarding their views on video surveillance, privacy attitudes in general,
and public behavior.
In this study, 24 subjects were recruited from a randomly selected pool of student
and sta®. Out of the 24 recruited, 21 subjects completed both parts of the study.
Of these 21 participants, 11 were female and 10 male; their ages ranged from 18-26
years. All subjects had completed a high school or greater level of education.
9.1.1 Research Questions
In running this study, there are two main issues we focus on: 1) what are the
privacy expectations observed individuals have in public spaces and 2) if the four
proposed ¯ltering measures uphold these expectations and how they can be used in
embedded design.
In tackling these two issues, there are ¯ve research questions that are looked at:
Question 1: How do subjects feel performing di®erent common activities in
public?128
Question 2: How do subjects feel about surveillance in di®erent spaces?
Question 3: How do subjects feel about race, gender, and their face being able
to be identi¯ed under surveillance?
Question 4: Do subjects feel their privacy is preserved by the four visual ¯lters
presented?
Question 5: Which ¯lter, of the four presented, do subjects choose in order to
preserve their privacy?
The ¯rst three questions address the issue of expectations of visual privacy in
public places under surveillance. Each address a di®erent aspect of what we think
might a®ect visual privacy expectations. The last two questions address the visual
¯ltering measures. These questions look at whether the ¯lters are privacy preserving
for observed individuals and what potential they have for embedded design solutions.
9.1.2 First Session: Scenario for Subject and Walk
Surveillance in public spaces captures di®ering activities and often times people
being observed are unaware of the fact that their activities are being monitored. To
emulate this in the experiment subjects came in for the ¯rst session and were told that
they were doing a study on behavior in public places, but no mention of surveillance
was made. Surveillance was speci¯cally not mentioned in order not to in°uence how
subjects acted in this ¯rst session. We wanted their reactions and participation to be
as natural as possible. The ¯rst session had three main parts to it:129
1. Pre-Walk Survey: Upon arrival, each subject ¯lled out a brief survey about
their demographics, including age and gender, and answer the questions for the
baseline on performing activities in public.
2. Walk: Following the survey, subjects were given a map with a route they were
to walk, a small shoulder bag with necessary items in it, and a list of activities
they would perform along their walk. The route on the map was chosen such
that it went through common public areas traveled by many people throughout
the course of the day. Additionally, since the route was very common, the
intention was that it would put the subjects at ease and they would act more
natural in this common setting. The activities that they had to perform are
activities that commonly take place in public spaces. The ¯ve activities the
subjects performed, in order, and the locations are as follows:
(a) Sit at a bus stop and read a magazine: This was the ¯rst activity on the
walk and an activity that allowed the subject some choice. There were
three magazines in the bag and the subject chose which one to read an
article in.
(b) Post °iers: Fliers for a local music show were provided in the bag and the
subject had to post 2-3 °iers in a public square on common public notice
boards.130
(c) Sit on the steps and eat a snack: Subjects were asked to sit on the steps
of a well-known campus building and choose a snack to eat from a bag we
provided. This also was an activity had a choice involved.
(d) Take pictures of a landmark: In this activity, subjects were asked to take
picture of a speci¯ed landmark.
(e) Ask an informational question: The last stop on the map led the subject
to a common place visited on campus that has an information desk. Here
the subject was given a question to ask the attendant at the desk.
3. Post-Walk Survey: After the walk, subjects returned and ¯lled out a followup
survey that had some questions regarding surveillance on it. Again, subjects
were not told they had been under surveillance.
9.1.3 First Session: Surveillance Setup
In the ¯rst session of our study, while the subjects were on their walk, three of
the ¯ve activities they performed were recorded by surveillance, speci¯cally activi-
ties 1, 3, and 4. Not all activities were recorded as it was not necessary and due to
physical limitations on where the cameras could be placed. The subjects still were
asked to perform these two unrecorded activities as it provided the needed time for
organizational purposes and provided the subject with a broader expanse of experi-
ence to comment on in the public space. Additionally, we did not want the subject to131
feel that they were constantly under surveillance to re°ect more realistic surveillance
conditions.
For each recorded activity, a single camera was designated for recording. Three
cameras were used, each placed at a location relative to the designated activity and
each having a di®erent type of viewing angle of the subjects. We used Panasonic KX-
HCM280A IP cameras and used their network capabilities to obtain data. These are
commercial cameras and of a quality that is becoming more common in surveillance
settings. The cameras have remote 350 degree pan and 220 degree tilt and a 21x
optical zoom. Between 4-12 frames per second were recorded over the network and
remote navigation of the cameras was done with 1s lag time resulting. The activities
recorded, as well as a demonstration of pan, tilt, and zoom capabilities of the cameras
and the level of detail they can capture, are shown in Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1: (Top Row) Frames from the three recorded activities for one subject. (Bottom
Row) The same three activities with the camera zoomed in for a closer shot.132
Each camera was actively monitored and maneuvered to obtain di®ering levels
of detail on the subject and the activity, similar to what is often done in modern
surveillance settings.
9.1.4 Second Session: Image Filtering Techniques
After obtaining the surveillance videos of the subjects, all the videos were put
through through four di®erent image ¯ltering techniques. The four ¯ltering techniques
that were used are:
1. Facial Obscuring: In this method we cover the head of the subject with a opaque
circle. This method imitates what is done in [79]. Since our subjects were not
wearing prescribed visual markers because we wanted them to feel as normal
as possible when performing the activities and because visual markers are not
used in areas under surveillance with current systems, a combination of face
detection and manual intervention was done to automatically hide the head.
For frames where the face could not be detected, we manually located the head
and placed an opaque circle over it.
2. Solid Silhouette: In this method, the subject is represented as a solid silhou-
ette. The silhouette is all white and covered the whole person. Background
subtraction was used to automatically form the silhouettes when the subject
was moving and could be detected as foreground by automatic background133
subtraction methods When the subject did not have enough motion, the solid
silhouette was manually create.
3. Outlines: With this ¯lter, the scene objects are outlined in white and everything
else is black. This is a fully automatic method that is based on edge detection
and curve formation techniques from computer vision.
4. Patch-Based Blur: This is an automatic ¯lter which takes an area of the image
and treats it as the same color and then blurs those areas across the image. The
blur ¯lter used in this study di®ers from what was tested in the media space
work by [12, 60]. In that work, a Gaussian-based image blur was used, which
simply blurs pixels in a neighboring radius together. The blur ¯lter tested in
this study is similar to what 3VR uses, in that it takes patches of pixels and
forces them to be a single color and blur is then done across these single color
patches. This way of ¯ltering provides less detailed information than gaussian
image ¯ltering.
Figure 9.2 shows examples of these ¯ltering techniques.
These four ¯ltering techniques were chosen for several reasons. First, these tech-
niques are only based on image features and do not depend on any prior knowledge of
the subject or the scene. While not all of these methods are completely automatic at
the moment, there is the potential for them to become so by using only image data.
Since the observed individuals do not interact with the surveillance technology, this134
study looks at visual privacy preservation measures that need no prior knowledge of
the observed individuals nor any interaction with them. An example of a privacy
measure to represent a person as a dot in the image with his/her name and age listed
below was given in [40]. However, this would require prior knowledge of the subject
and some interaction from the subject about their name and age. This is not possible
in most surveillance setups and does not lend itself well to embedded design. By using
¯ltering techniques based on image features alone, these techniques can be applied in
any surveillance setting and do not require interaction.
Second, the four ¯lters chosen are representative of many of the current techniques
being proposed for use by companies or by the research community. As discussed
in the Related Work section, facial obscuring, solid silhouettes, and blurring have all
been proposed, in some form, as privacy solutions. However, the is very minimal work
examining whether they are e®ective for observed individuals' privacy expectations
and none done for privacy expectations in public places. Outline images have not been
suggested for hiding identity, but outlines are often used in computer vision for picking
out key shapes and objects. It is a natural form of image abstraction that might aid
in visual privacy. Using these ¯ltering techniques, we can analyze if the methods
proposed by industry and research are actually e®ective at providing an observed
individual with a sense of visual privacy and what direction(s) the development should
continue down.135
Third, the ¯ltering techniques used in the study abstract a certain amount of
information, but leave much of the scene data intact. Thus, if a camera operator is
looking at the video with these ¯lters on, they can still see the scene. With obscuring
the head, only human heads are hidden from view from a camera operator. The rest
of the scene in the video is entirely intact. In the solid silhouette, the humans in
the scene become ¯lled-in silhouettes, but everything else in the video scene remains
intact. With the solid silhouette details, such as the face and the skin tone and
what the person is wearing, cannot be seen. Also, small motion, like blinking, cannot
be seen, but large overall motion of the humans, like walking or jumping, can be.
With the outline ¯lter, color is completely removed from the image and major shapes
become outlines. Smaller, less prominent shapes do not appear and details, such as
color and texture, are hidden from view. Prominent objects in the scene can still be
detected as well as their motion. With the Patch-based blur, portions of the scene
are blurred together. This hides details of the scene. For example, a face gets blurred
together so you can no longer pick out the eyes and mouth or see the nose. Color and
motion are still present in the scene.
9.1.5 Second Session: Follow-up and Survey
The subjects from the ¯rst session returned for their second session 3-7 days later.
In the second session subjects were told that they had been under video surveillance
in the ¯rst session. They then were asked to rank how comfortable they now felt136
Figure 9.2: (First Row) The head obscuring ¯lter at the bus stop activity. (Second Row)
The patch-based blur shown on the stairs activity. (Third Row) the solid silhouette ¯lter
shown on the third activity at the stairs. (Fourth Row) The outline ¯lter shown at the bus
stop activity.
performing those ¯ve activities while under surveillance and were also asked which
groups they would be comfortable with monitoring those activities.
They were next shown the un¯ltered videos of themselves on their walk performing
the three activities that were recorded. They were asked to state how they felt about
being surveilled doing these activities. Following this, they were shown their videos
under the visual ¯ltering measures. The ¯ltering measures were shown one at a time.137
Immediately after a visual ¯ltering measure was shown, and before moving on to the
next ¯ltering measure, the subjects were asked to rate the ¯lter on how e®ective they
felt it was at preserving their privacy. They were also asked to rank how comfortable
they would feel performing the activities on the walk if that ¯lter was in place. Once
all visual ¯ltering measures were shown, the subjects were then asked to rank the
¯lters in order of most privacy preserving to least privacy preserving. It is important
to note that no audio was present on any of the videos. As the focus is on the visual
privacy aspect, only visual data was presented.
9.2 Results from Subject Participants
9.2.1 Results
The ¯ndings from this study are organized according to the two speci¯c issues
focused on: 1) what are the privacy expectations that observed individuals have
in public spaces and 2) how do the four proposed ¯ltering measures uphold these
expectations and if they can be used in embedded design.
9.2.2 Visual Privacy Expectations
To discover what subjects' expectations of visual privacy are, we examined three
di®erent aspects: activity, place, and identifying factors. First, we looked at how
comfortable subjects rated performing certain activities in public. We did this to see138
if there was a trend with particular activities that subjects were sensitive to doing in
public which might warrant privacy protection. In the ¯rst session the subjects were
asked to rate each of ten activities commonly performed in public from uncomfortable
to comfortable. The ten activities are:
1. Eating
2. Taking photographs
3. Playing sports
4. Making a call on a cell phone
5. Asking a stranger for information
6. Handing out or posting °yers
7. Wearing clothing that might call attention to yourself
8. Reading a newspaper, book, or magazine
9. Participating in a political activity
10. Talking to a friend
To determine whether there is a signi¯cant e®ect between certain activities and
comfort of performing them in public, we did a within-subjects, one-way ANOVA test
with activity being the independent variable, with ten levels to it each corresponding139
to a speci¯c activity. The dependent variable is the level of comfort. The results from
performing the ANOVA are shown in Figure 9.3
As can be seen from the results, subjects are not as comfortable performing certain
activities in public as they are with others. In particular, activities 6, 7, and 9 are
more sensitive for subjects. These correspond to handing out posters or °yers, wearing
clothing that might call attention to yourself, and participating in a political activity.
Next, we looked at how subjects felt about the use of surveillance in di®erent
settings. Ten options were presented of the types of places where surveillance might
be found:
1. Privately owned store
2. Shopping mall
3. Bank
4. University campus or building
5. Public parks or plazas
6. Residential streets
7. Sports stadium
8. Public transit vehicles
9. Airports140
10. Parking Garages
These ten places were chosen as they are representative of places where surveillance
cameras are currently found. Again, we ran a within-subject, one-way ANOVA to
see if expectations of where surveillance is appropriate varied among places. The
independent variable is place and there are ten level each representing a speci¯c
place. The dependent variable is appropriateness of use of surveillance. The results
from performing the ANOVA are shown in Figure 9.4.
From the results, it can be seen that the level of appropriateness subjects feel
for using surveillance does vary based on place. In particular, subjects feel public
places such as parks and plazas and residential streets are less appropriate for using
surveillance in as opposed to privately owned spaces and enclosed spaces, such as
stores, malls, banks, airports, and garages.
Last, we looked at how sensitive subjects were to having di®erent personal aspects
observed by surveillance. Questions in the second survey were asked in the ¯rst
session, before each subject took their walk, regarding:
1. Race
2. Gender
3. Face
The survey had questions about theses identifying features because they are com-
mon features mentioned in the surveillance literature for identi¯cation and use.141
We ran a within-subject, one-way ANOVA to see subjects' comfort level of having
these features identi¯ed in surveillance varies. The independent variable is the iden-
tifying feature, with three levels each representing one of the three speci¯c features
listed above. The dependent variable is the comfort level with these features being
monitored by surveillance. The results from performing the ANOVA are shown in
Figure 9.5.
As can be seen from the results, a particular identifying feature does e®ect the
subject's concern. In particular, the face is the feature most subjects are concerned
with being identi¯ed under surveillance.
9.2.3 Visual Filters
To discover how subjects feel about visual ¯ltering measures in regard to their
privacy expectations, we examine the subject responses on the ¯lters.
First, we looked at how subjects rated their comfort in doing the ¯ve activities
they performed on the walk by examining the data from the ¯rst session survey. This
data is a subset of what was already shown in Figure 9.3. As we know, activity does
a®ect comfort level, and the activities we had subjects perform spanned much of the
di®ering levels. Posting °yers was ranked more uncomfortable, taking photos and
asking a stranger for information had more average comfort ratings, and eating and
reading were comfortable activities. Thus, the activities we had subjects perform on
the walk provided a range of comfort levels.142
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 94.82 9 10.5356 18.48 0
Error 108.3 190 0.57
Total 203.12 199
Figure 9.3: Activities: (Top) the ANOVA table for privacy results across the 10 activities
(Bottom) the box plot for the ANOVA results showing that there is a variance in sensitivity
depending on the activity
Next, we compared activities against the di®erent visual ¯lter measures. For
each ¯lter, subjects were asked to rank how comfortable they were performing the
¯ve activities with this ¯lter on. We did a within-subject, two-way ANOVA with the
independent variables being the activity and ¯lter. For activity, there are ¯ve di®erent
levels corresponding to the ¯ve speci¯c activities. For the ¯lter type, there are four
levels corresponding to the four di®erent visual ¯lters. The dependent variable is143
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 82.38 9 9.15333 16.66 0
Error 104.4 190 0.54947
Total 186.78 199
Figure 9.4: Places: (Top) the ANOVA table for privacy results across the 10 places
(Bottom) the box plot for the ANOVA results showing that there is a variance in sensitivity
depending on the place
comfort. The results from the test are shown in Table 9.1. As it shows, there is
no interaction between activity and ¯lter in e®ecting the comfort. The comfort is
a®ected by ¯lter type alone.
Given these ¯ndings, we then performed within-subject, one-way ANOVAS across
all the activities, with a given ¯lter on or o®. The results the ¯lters are shown Figures144
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 16.7937 2 8.39683 9.53 0.0003
Error 52.8571 60 0.88095
Total 69.6508 62
Figure 9.5: Identifying Factors: (Top) the ANOVA table for privacy results across the 3
identifying factors (Bottom) the box plot for the ANOVA results showing that there is a
variance in sensitivity depending on the identifying factor
9.6a, 9.6b, 9.6c, and 9.6d.
In looking at the results from these ANOVA tests, it can be seen that the Back-
ground, Outline, and Blur ¯lters have an e®ect on comfort. Having the face ¯lter on
or o®, however, does not e®ect comfort.
In order to answer the last research question, we performed within-subject, one-145
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 16.883 3 5.63778 19.37 0
Rows 0.681 4 0.17024 0.6729
Interaction 0.557 12 0.04643 0.16 0.9995
Error 116.19 400 0.29048
Total 134.312 419
Table 9.1: Anova Table for Activities
way ANOVA across all the ¯lters types and the subjects' ratings at how well they
thought the ¯lters preserved their privacy. The factor is the type of visual ¯lter
measure, with four levels, each representing one of the four ¯lter types. The dependent
variable is privacy preservation. The results are shown in Figure 9.7a. As can be seen,
the type of ¯lter does have an e®ect on how well subjects feel their privacy is preserved.
Given these e®ects, we next look at which ¯lter subjects feel is best at preserving
their privacy since there is a di®erence between ¯lters. In the second session, subjects
ranked all four ¯lters from most privacy preserving to least privacy preserving. We
again performed a within-subject, one-way ANOVA on this rank data with
the independent variable is the type of visual ¯lter measurement. The dependent
variable is privacy preservation rank. The results are shown in Figure 9.7b. As can be
seen, the background ¯lter receives the best rank for being privacy preserving. Thus,
this is the visual ¯lter that subjects feel is most e®ective.146
9.2.4 Discussion
With this study, we set out to evaluate visual privacy in public spaces from the
perspective of the observed individual. In particular, we want to know: 1) what are
the privacy expectations observed individuals have in public spaces and 2) if the four
proposed ¯ltering measures uphold these expectations and how they can be used in
embedded design. Here we discuss the analysis of these issues given the results from
our data and our research questions.
9.2.5 Privacy Expectations
The ¯rst three of our research questions look at the expectations observed indi-
viduals have on visual privacy in public spaces.
Question 1: Do common public activities vary in privacy sensitivity?
When subjects were asked to rate ten di®erent common public activities, the re-
sults from our survey showed that there is a statistically signi¯cant di®erence between
the comfort levels people feel in performing these activities in public. Not all activi-
ties that are performed in public are always comfortable for subjects to have others
observe. These results tell us that not all public activities should be considered equal
and thus, surveiling these activities is not equally acceptable to subjects. Since sub-
jects vary in their sensitivity to having these activities observed in public, having
these observed by a wider audience through surveillance is a concern. This gives
us an indication that in places where more sensitive activities are likely to occur, it147
becomes even more crucial to focus on privacy protection measures.
Even for reading a magazine, an activity subjects felt comfortable doing, there
was a statistically meaningful di®erence between comfort levels reported on the ¯rst
session for doing this in public and the comfort level they reported on the second
session after knowing they had been under surveillance, but before they saw their
videos. The rating on comfort once they knew they had been under surveillance
was less than the originally reported comfort levels from the ¯rst session. While
the comfort level of the eating and photo-taking activities showed no statistically
signi¯cant change, this further indicates that the type of activity does have an e®ect on
comfort at being observed through surveillance. Even some activities that individuals
are comfortable performing in public, where people can observe them, are not as
comfortable for subjects' to have surveilled.
Question 2: Is there a di®erence in comfort level with surveillance in di®erent
places?
From the survey results, it is clear that in di®erent places individuals have di®er-
ent expectations as to whether they should be surveilled in those places and how. For
places considered more enclosed and privately held, such as stores, malls, banks, air-
ports, and parking garages, subjects thought it was appropriate to have surveillance.
Thus, there is an expectations on being observed in these areas and it considered ac-
ceptable. However, in contrast, the more open, public spaces listed in the survey, such
as residential streets, public parks and plazas, and campuses, were ranked by subjects148
as inappropriate for surveillance to be present. Subjects do not feel it is appropriate
to be watched in these areas by remote surveillance. In these areas then, subjects
would be more sensitive to having their actions observed and recorded. There is an
expectation that what is done in these public spaces is only observable by those in
the vicinity and is not observable through surveillance. This was tested both in the
¯rst and second session with no statistical di®erence between ratings of any of the
places and comfort levels between sessions.
Question 3: Which identifying factors are of more concern to individuals being
surveilled?
In looking at the results for the identifying factors of race, gender, and face -
which are items noted as being observed by camera operators - there was a clear
distinction with these factors. Having their gender and race recognized was not
nearly as concerning for subjects as having their face identi¯ed. One might speculate
that the face is a more personal feature, unique for each person, and that this is a
more identifying feature than race or gender. Both race and gender ranked at the
same level of concern. Thus, in looking at visual privacy, it is more important that
the face is unidenti¯able in the image as opposed to race or gender.
In looking across all these ¯ndings to answer the issue of expectations on privacy
that people have in public places, it is clear that there is an expectation on privacy in
public spaces regarding surveillance. Even though our subjects are from a generation
that grew up immersed in technology, they still are not comfortable with everything149
being observed. Activity, place, and identifying features all have an e®ect and no
single aspect can be discounted. Thus, when examining surveillance and the e®ect
a system will have, these aspects must be taken into account. In more open, pub-
lic spaces, individuals do not think surveillance is as appropriate as in more closed,
privately owned spaces. When installing a surveillance system up in a place that is
more open and public, such as parks and plazas, what activities and what factors
are monitored must be considered. If more personal activities which express opin-
ions and taste, such as political activities and °yer distribution, are going on in a
place, these are sensitive activities for observed individuals. As there already is the
expectation that surveillance is not appropriate in public spaces, then having these
sensitive activities surveilled in a public space is not expected nor deemed appro-
priate. Additionally, if the surveillance system shows and tracks faces, this is also
deemed uncomfortable for subjects and is a privacy concern. Therefore, in designing
these systems, trying to account for the privacy expectations of individuals in that
particular place, and which factors to focus on, are important.
9.2.6 Filters in Relation to Privacy
In order to try and preserve expectations of visual privacy in public spaces under
surveillance, we examined at four di®erent visual ¯ltering measures and how subjects'
perceptions of them.
Do subjects feel their privacy is preserved by the four visual ¯lters150
presented?
From the results, there was a clear di®erence between the ¯ltering measures. When
looking at ¯lters in conjunction with activity, the comfort level subjects felt depended
only on the ¯lter, not the particular activity being performed, even if the activity
was deemed as being uncomfortable to perform in public. Thus, the ¯lters can be
judged for e®ectiveness independent of activity. When looking at the results across
the ¯lters, it can be seen that the facial obscuring measure provided less comfort as
opposed to the other three measures. The outline ¯lter and blur ¯lters were next,
with no meaningful statistical signi¯cance between them, and the solid silhouette
¯lter was thought to be the most privacy preserving.
Even though subjects' responses to identifying features indicated that the face
was the aspect they wanted the most protection of, from the ¯lter responses we can
see that obscuring just the face is not enough. The solid silhouette ¯lter hides not
only the face, but other visual details of the observed individual. The solid silhouette
¯lter shows large motions of the observed individual and the shape of the human. The
shape of the human can perhaps lead to a determination of gender if more gender
identifying features, for example a ponytail on the head, are displayed. However,
the race and all small motions or activities are hidden. From the results, this ¯lter
provides the level of visual detail that observed individuals are comfortable providing
under surveillance in public spaces.
What visual privacy ¯lter of the four do subjects prefer for privacy151
preservation?
The result from the prior questions showing the solid silhouette being the preferred
¯lter was further supported by the results from the survey when we asked subjects
to rank the ¯lters on the order of privacy preservation. The solid silhouette ¯lter was
ranked as the most privacy preserving, while the blur ¯lter ranked the next highest,
then the outline ¯lter, and then the facial obscuring ¯lter. The facial obscuring ¯lter
still provided a detailed level of information about the observed individual other than
the face, which is still a concern for visual privacy by subjects. The outline ¯lter still
shows a certain level of detail on the face, which is probably why this ¯lter ranks
lower than the blur and solid silhouette, even though it hides most of the detailed
information on the human, including race, since color is removed.152
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 20.743 1 20.7429 46.42 0
Error 92.952 208 0.4469
Total 113.695 209
(a) Solid silhouette ¯lter o® vs. on
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 0.305 1 0.30476 0.53 0.4692
Error 120.552 208 0.57958
Total 120.857 209
(b) Face obscuring ¯lter o® vs. on
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 6.519 1 6.51905 11.05 0.0011
Error 122.762 208 0.5902
Total 129.281 209
(c) Comfort with outline ¯lter o® vs. on.
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 10.971 1 10.9714 21.25 0
Error 107.41 208 0.5164
Total 118.381 209
(d) Patched-based blur ¯lter o® vs. on.
Figure 9.6: Comfort level with the ¯lter on versus o® done for each ¯lter independently.
The ANOVA table is shown above the box plot each of the sub¯gures153
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 18.7619 3 6.25397 14.55 0
Error 34.381 80 0.4296
Total 53.1429 83
(a) Independent ¯lter privacy rating
Source SS df MS F Prob > F
Columns 50.5238 3 16.8413 24.73 0
Error 54.4762 80 0.681
Total 105 83
(b)Overall ¯lter rankings
Figure 9.7: The ¯lter ratings with the ANOVA table shown above the box plot each of
the sub¯gures154
Chapter 10
Visual Privacy Discussion
Technology is neither good nor bad, nor even neutral. Technology is one
part of the complex of relationships that people form with each other and
the world around them; it simply cannot be understood outside of that
concept.
Samuel Collins
Visual privacy is a complex subject and our work provides insight into expectations
of privacy with public surveillance. While surveillance networks have bene¯ts, we
hope to ¯nd a way to balance these with privacy expectations. In this ¯nal chapter, we
discuss where the current technology is for ¯ltering measures and future development
directions for these ¯lters. Additionally, we discuss future directions with our work
in trying to achieve this balance.155
10.0.7 Current State of the Technology and Recommenda-
tions
The results of our study suggest that there are expectations of privacy in public
spaces and that the visual ¯ltering measures can provide privacy preservation for in-
dividuals. Thus, visual ¯ltering measures can be used for embedded design in order
to take into account the needs of observed individuals. It is desirable to have embed-
ded privacy preservation measures in place so that observed individuals acting within
the space are not inhibited by the camera technology and there remain places where
individuals feel comfortable expressing themselves through actions like participating
in political activities and posting °yers.
Implementing a ¯lter through embedded design implies that the visual ¯lter must
be automatic. The observed individual in the place has no interaction with the system
and the camera operators. On the other end of the system, the operator should not
have control over when the ¯lter is on or o® as they can violate an individual's privacy
by turning the ¯lter o®. The ¯lter must be run automatically on the images from
the cameras without input from the individual or the camera operator. In trying
to balance the needs of the camera operators, if it is deemed necessary to view the
un¯ltered images, then a password or another security mechanism can be used to turn
the ¯lter o®. However, the default setting should be so the ¯lter is automatically on
in order to preserve privacy.
Our ¯ndings show that the solid silhouette ¯lter provides individuals with the best156
sense of visual privacy preservation. Currently, this sort of ¯lter is not fully automatic.
In order to make this type of ¯lter automatic, there is further research that needs
to be done in analyzing video. The current state-of-the-art work from the computer
vision community provides a few di®erent methods to do this solid silhouette ¯lter,
but all these have limitations given certain circumstances. Moving objects in a scene
can be segmented from the background using background subtraction methods. A
review of background subtraction approaches is given in [71]. These methods work
well when objects are in motion, but when the object stops moving, it becomes part
of the background and its identity is revealed. It is not suitable to preserve privacy
only when individuals are in motion. Thus, background subtraction alone is not
enough to do the solid silhouette ¯lter. Other computer vision methods, such as
pedestrian tracking and human detection, use shape to ¯nd humans, an example of
which is discussed in [94, 93]. However, these methods are still not very advanced and
typically can only ¯nd humans in upright poses, but have di±culty when humans are
sitting or are in more articulated poses. Face detection could also be used as a cue to
where a human is, but if the human is turned around or if the face is occluded or hard
to detect, then face detection will fail. For privacy protection, more research needs to
be done in the computer vision community into detecting humans, and possibly how
to combine current approaches, in order to make a fully automatic solid silhouette
¯lter.
This gives a direction for vision researchers and industries interested in visual157
privacy to focus on. In the mean time, methods such as the blur ¯lter, which was
ranked as a second to the solid silhouette ¯lter, can be used automatically. This
method is fully automatic at the current time and could be use in embedded design.
Based on the environment the cameras are in, the parameters on these algorithms,
such as to what level things should be outlined at or what amount of blur should
occur, will need to set.
10.1 Towards a Balance with Visual Privacy
As privacy is a very context-sensitive issue, with this work we have looked speci¯-
cally and privacy in the context of surveillance of public places. We have demonstrated
that observed individuals have an expectation of privacy in public spaces which is ef-
fected by many di®ering factors including activity, location, and identifying features.
Given this, we have also shown that visual ¯ltering measures are e®ective for observed
individuals at upholding their visual privacy expectations. This work is one step to
better understanding visual privacy in relation to camera networks.
It is important to continue analyzing privacy in the setting of public surveillance.
In particular, looking at how we can balance the needs of the camera operators and
observed individuals with di®erent measures, such as technology. While policies by
governing bodies can help set the regulations for camera networks, technical inno-
vations can help uphold such regulations while balancing the privacy needs of the
observed individuals.158
In future directions of this work, we will explore the needs of camera operators
and how they are using their surveillance cameras. We will focus on police use of
surveillance and how they interpret the image data for their use. We will then see
how we can balance their needs with privacy expectations in public settings and
whether technology measures, such as visual ¯lters, can be bene¯cial doing so.159
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
This dissertation started by looking at the way camera networks have changed over
time and the current state of camera networks which have become more pervasive,
larger, and able to capture and store dynamic data more easily. These changes have
led to challenges in data correlation, data integrity, and data privacy. The substantive
sets of chapters dealt with a speci¯c project involving each of these various notions,
respectively, given the current state of camera networks: localization using dynamic
scenes, attack detection on cameras in uncontrolled locations, and a study of visual
privacy expectations in public settings with surveillance. With this work we have
provided some steps to improve the way current camera networks operate and using
dynamic scene data for applications.
We hope that our work will inspire others to continue examining the area of
camera networks, and multi-view settings, and go beyond the single image to look at161
the dynamic information that is becoming so prevalent. Video data provides a rich
source of information that is only starting to be explored. Additionally, we hope to
inspire others to continue working in the intersection of technology and society and
be part of the process to uphold the balance between man and machine.162
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